



Daily Report

East Europe

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NOTICE TO READERS: All material in this volume previously disseminated in electronic form.
An Ω indicates a Foreign Media Note.

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Cooperation Discussed With FYROM Official

AU1503175294 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 15 Mar 94

[Text] On 15 March at the Boyana residence, Evgeni Matinchev, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Industry Minister Rumen Bikov met Jovan Andonov, deputy prime minister for Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM].

The possibility of transit transportation of Macedonian goods through Bulgaria, cooperation between our enterprises and Skopje companies, and the possibility of granting help to Macedonia were discussed.

The work of the two delegations continues in specialized commissions, where issues related to bilateral cooperation in transportation, industry, customs control, and road construction were specified.

SDS Sets Date for Talks, Supports Early Vote

AU1503141594 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 15 Mar 94

[Text] The National Coordinating Council of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] decided to hold the Sixth SDS National Conference on 14-15 May. The forum will discuss issues related to the election tactics, the future government, and the SDS's partners.

It was pointed out that the attitude of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] toward the government is totally irresponsible. The country's economic and political situation and the questionable status of the cabinet require the urgent initiative of President Zhelev, who, according to the SDS, must immediately begin consultations with the political forces.

The SDS sees the only solution to the situation in the country as early elections.

Commentary Warns of Communist Revival in BSP

AU1503172194 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 9 Mar 94
p 16

[Commentary by DUMA Editor in Chief Stefan Prodev: "Harsh Thoughts"]

[Text] Although its date is not yet fixed, the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] congress draws near. One senses this especially well in the local organizations that are preparing or holding their accountability-election meetings. Spirits are gradually being stirred, and thousands of Socialists are attempting to look into the future. They feel simultaneously attracted and alarmed by the idea, because the times are complex and changeable. On the one hand, hopes are high, and on the other, black clouds are gathering. Many want a sea change within both the party and society, whereas others fear any change at all. This brings people into confrontation, whether they want it or not, and casts them into conflict.

Of course, the conflicts should not be dramatized, whatever they may be. In times like these they are quite natural and mirror the essence of life. The BSP is still a party with traditions that have not outlived their time, a party of painful restructuring that fires it with different kinds of energy. It still wavers between recollections of the past and the present day, filled with glorious dreams and new political plans. There can be no doubt that this is what holds it in a state of inner tension, which, combined with crude antisocialist attacks from outside, makes it face major tests. However, despite everything, the party remains whole; despite the waves that rock the party's ship, it sails on toward the promised land. Those who expect the party to collapse will surely be disappointed, not because the ship is threatened by storms and leaks, but because its crew has a clear common goal, despite their sentiments and quarrels. This is the goal of social justice, of spiritual revival, of saving Bulgaria from blue [color of Union of Democratic Forces, SDS] ruin. This is more than certain, more than mere optimism.

However, the mere awareness that the conflicts are inevitable, even if they are not disastrous, is not enough. This must not make us either slightly gullible or overcredulous. In addition to their natural inevitability, the conflicts have their own inner tectonics, with unpredictable forces that are difficult to control. These are the forces of sharp confrontation, of complete rejection of the road we have traveled, that are concealed in the hardest layers of the rich party soil. For almost four years these forces have existed unseen, confused and frightened by the cataclysm in society and apparently doomed to remain immobile for all time. However, now, the slightest slackening of the political pressure or the crude aggression brings them out of the latent state into which they have fallen. They are now shaking themselves out of this state and are entering into the preconference dialogue, speaking sometimes softly, sometimes with more strident tones. Many of those who slept through the hard years in which the fate of the socialist idea was being decided are now coming onto the stage, ready to rout the saviors of the socialist idea. This is no longer simply a duel between two sets of views, but a kind of attempt at resurrecting the old and forgotten ideas.

Perhaps some of the more peace-loving among us will reject these alarming findings, but they should not be in too much of a hurry to do so. These findings are not invented. It is already well-known that there are some people here and there who propose to restore the party's old name, to declare once again its Leninist origins, to reestablish democratic centralism, and revive the party's revolutionary character. They not only doubt the advantages of democracy, but also reject its achievements so far, small though they may be. Some of them are even ready to deny the cause of DUMA and propose the reestablishment of the newspaper that for 45 years disseminated the so-called party truth—the paper with its orders depicted on its masthead, carrying above its name the slogan that has lost its meaning with the passage of time. These people do not recognize party

pluralism, they reject separate ideological trends, and accuse anyone who thinks more freely of treason. Having failed to understand the present and being alien to its complex nature, they daydream about "their own" time, as if history was able to bring it back for them. See how many old and rejected conceptions about the party and life are trying to varying extents to influence the pre-congress dialogue and deflect it in a wrong direction. There should be no doubt that certain retrograde circles that missed their chance need an earthquake and are trying to provoke one. They will certainly fail, because they form part of the rear baggage train of the BSP and social development, but this does not mean that we should underestimate them. They are in our midst, and this is good enough reason to put us on our guard. It is not only the sick imaginations of the right-wing forces in the SDS, but also these friends of ours who are nourishing the fiction of some kind of recommunization. Their threadbare thoughts and ideological visions not only scare the Socialist Party, but the general population as well.

The awakening of these subterranean strata within the BSP is a major warning signal for the upcoming congress. It will be dangerous, as well as harmful, if they are able to influence the work of the congress. Then the congress will become an arena that will disturb not only the party, but society as well. In this context, the election of delegates to the congress is transformed from a formal procedure into an almost momentous act. The party organization should send to their supreme forum not merely "our own people" or "good comrades," but individuals who have proved their political maturity and wisdom, persons totally dedicated to the new spirit of the BSP and determined to make a final break with the past and transform the BSP into a truly modern party, which means a party with a deep awareness of parliamentary democracy, a party of broad social dialogue, a party with a pluralistic approach to the problems, and a lofty national awareness. It must be a party of people whom Bulgaria values and loves. If this does not come about, the congress will take a wrong turn, whether we want it or not. The times of pompous statements, empty speeches, pledges of loyalty, ideological sentiments, and even more

sentimental concepts of the future are past and gone. Every elected delegate must enter the congress hall aware that he is a man of the new time, that he defends a socialist idea in an antisocial society, and that our goal today is not simply power, but the salvation and ennoblement of man. At the present moment, the BSP can have no higher goal than this. Anyone who does not understand this may speak eloquently, but he will not be of the least help. Therefore, those who disturb the people with their outmoded speeches and degraded ideas about life should not seek to be called to the speaker's platform. They can only blow up the party and change it from a means to achieve new changes into a bunker for unnecessary battles.

I do not know whether everyone will agree with the content and deep feeling embodied in the thoughts I have expressed. However, this is not important. It is more important for them to instill these thoughts in their own consciousness and remember them when they have to assess one or another form of conduct. For the people from the party's rear baggage train, those who are launching reckless criticisms that do not in the least help the new spirit, do not deserve to be patronized. They are noisy disrupters of the calm and are seeking backdated recognition. One may understand them from a purely human viewpoint, but they must receive no support or encouragement. Their belated energy is no help to the BSP. Although in many cases it is sincere, it is not beneficial. The only thing that this energy can achieve is to exacerbate the inevitable conflicts that I mentioned in the beginning, and turn them into a crisis. Let no one forget that our party contains many new shoots. If we want to keep it whole, we should neither accuse them nor trample them in the mud, as certain rough "gardeners" seem to be doing just now. Therefore, let us listen to what they have to say, because they have the right to speak, but let us not follow their advice. Their way does not lead anywhere. It cannot be the way of the BSP, because the party of the Bulgarian Socialists wants to live despite the difficulties and bad omens. It is not a rock, as some like to think, but a spring, a spring for the thirsty to drink from, not for those who are looking for somewhere to wash their old clothes.

Klaus: Country Will Survive Zhirinovskiy Visit

LD1503130494 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1100 GMT 15 Mar 94

[Text] Vladimir Zhirinovskiy said at a news conference in Warsaw yesterday that he intends to visit Prague on Sunday. In this connection, our correspondent David Stahlavsky spoke to Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus:

[Begin recording] [Stahlavsky] I have asked you about your views before. At the time, you expressed the belief that it would not occur to the Russian radical nationalist to visit the Czech Republic. It appears that it has occurred to him, but, above all, it occurred to the crowds close to the Association for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia. How will the leadership of our state react to this visit? What will our democracy have to hear before it behaves like other Western democracies—for example, in Germany and other places, where Mr. Zhirinovskiy was declared persona non grata?

[Klaus] Well, Mr. Zhirinovskiy is no doubt persona non grata in our country at the moment, but I am using the expression non grata in the general civic meaning. I am not using it as a technical term of international law. We do not want him here. It is in this sense that he is not desirable in our country, and the few Mr. Sladeks [head of the Republican Party] who want him here, well, I think they are again indicating clearly where he belongs and what we all are to think about him.

I am not fully convinced that we should proceed from undesirability, in the general sense of the word, to the term persona non grata, in the legal sense of the word, and formally bloc the arrival of Mr. Zhirinovskiy in our country. The government has not made any decision in principle about it, either. I do not rule out that it will become a topic of at least brief talks at the government session tomorrow morning. I really would not like to predetermine this matter.

I think it is a pity, a waste of time, and stupid. On the other hand, I am fully convinced that our democracy is strong enough to survive this visit in peace without being threatened in any way. [end recording]

Minister Views Situation on Slovakia Border

LD1503143794 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 0600 GMT 15 Mar 94

[Text] Interior Minister Jan Ruml spoke about the situation on the Czech-Slovak border following the culmination of the political crisis in Slovakia yesterday. Together with his departmental colleagues, he is attending a session at Plumlov, Prostějov district.

He said:

[Begin Ruml recording] As for the state border, naturally, the talks must be suspended at the moment because they have been transformed to the level of political talks,

that is the level of two governments, two prime ministers. This means that the controversial points must be frozen.

The border should be delimited in the places where the border commission was capable of agreeing, and I assume that the next Slovak government will be interested in talking about these matters and that we will agree in the end on the two parts of the state border, above all for the benefit of the people. [end recording]

Klaus on Agricultural Policy, Political Program

LD1503200094

[Editorial Report] Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech at 1715 GMT on 15 March broadcast the regular Tuesday interview with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus, prepared by correspondent David Stahlavsky. The program lasted 10 minutes.

Answering questions, the prime minister spoke about the general reasons for unemployment in Western countries, the allocation of privatization points by Czech people, and the agricultural policy as approved by the government recently. In this context, the prime minister said:

"I think that our merciless pressure to abolish protectionism in our exports, as well as lifting subsidies on Western exports of agricultural produce to our country, is producing certain results. When I was in Great Britain last week and then in Brussels, I had talks with both Mr. Delors and Mr. Christophersen, who is, so to speak, the European Union finance minister. They both indicated that the problem of not subsidizing the exports of agricultural products eastward is suddenly becoming an issue. Originally, this problem was not part of their vocabulary at all. This problem is now there, and they are becoming aware that something has to be done about it."

While giving his opinion on the implementation of the government's political program, the prime minister said:

"It would be a major institutional and political change if we established a senate in this country. This act or decisionmaking on this matter and the pace of this step are totally different, and I think it is useless to speed up anything in this matter. I will bet that those who are trying to speed up this process are doing so not because they are ignorant of the pace of political life, as I am trying to explain it here. They are not doing it because they think we could not do without a senate tomorrow or the day after. They are using this matter as political cards. They keep pulling out these cards, and that makes it possible for these political parties to say something more definite. They simply pull out a card, and, by doing so, they get media space, the papers, the radio, and so on. I cannot accept this. It is not possible to turn the territorial setup and the Senate into substitute problems that would be tackled at the cost of those problems that are much more urgent."

The last question concerned the granting of citizenship to former Czech aristocrats and the return of their property. The prime minister said he hoped that all aspects of this complex issue will have been taken into consideration when laws are adopted.

Dlouhy Views Economic Ties to Slovakia

LD1503165194 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1300 GMT 15 Mar 94

[Excerpt] At noon today, Trade and Industry Minister Vladimir Dlouhy took part in talks held by the Left Bloc deputies' group, which were open to the public.

Milan Repka has phoned in the following report:

[begin recording] [Repka] Vladimir Dlouhy said at this meeting that, thanks to the [European Union] association agreement, Czech exports reached 15-20 percent [as heard] in 1993.

As for the Slovak Republic, there was a reduction in the volume of reciprocal trade by about 20 percent in the first half of 1993, and reciprocal trade stagnated at this level in the second half of 1993.

Asked by Zdenek Vorlicek, a Left Bloc deputy and member of the Economic Committee, why the Czech Republic had reduced its exports to the countries of the former USSR to the current 8 percent [as heard], Dlouhy said that he firmly rejected the allegation that the Czech Republic will be withdrawing from Russian markets, thereby creating space for Western traders. According to Minister Dlouhy, one has to realize the extent to which the former states of the USSR are solvent and capable of paying for goods delivered.

Tomas Sojka, a member of the Economic Committee, was interested in knowing how the Czech Republic will behave as regards cooperation with the Visegrad Group of states. Dlouhy said that the Czech Government opposes the unnatural political institutionalization of mutual relations, but this is not valid for the sphere of economic cooperation, where the Czech Government supports the widest liberalization of reciprocal trade. [passage omitted]

State of Economic Reform in 1993

AU1503153294 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 10, 11 Mar 94

[Article in two installments by "vac": "1993—The Fourth Year of the Reform"]

[11 Mar p 7]

[Text] The dominant feature of the economic development was stabilization; maintaining the balance and the trend to dynamically reinforce it on the macroeconomic level. The partition of the CSFR did not manifest itself in the Czech Republic by any obvious economic problems. The monetary policy caught the impact of the

currency division in the first quarter and maintained the stability of the currency, including its rate of exchange. Favorable foreign currency reserves have been established. The volume of exports grew significantly. The economic standard measured by the volume of the GNP remained basically at the 1992 level. The economic structure changed only through the influence of private enterprise. Because of the needs of the open economy of the Czech state, the structure of large industry has not changed favorably.

The trend of the GNP development was responded to the aggregate demand that indicated a recovery of economic activity. In comparison with 1992, retail sales grew in 1993 by 1 percent in constant prices, services soared by 15 percent, investment demand rose 17 percent (in the first to third quarters of 1993, in comparison with the same period a year earlier, it will decline in the fourth quarter because of the huge increase in the fourth quarter of 1992), and exports grew by 20 percent (by approximately 11 percent, including Slovakia). Part of the increased demand was covered by a stock reduction. The aggregate supply from the main production sectors remained below the 1992 level: Industrial output declined by 5.3 percent, construction output by 7.5 percent, and agricultural output by 0.8 percent. So far, the changes in the general structure of industrial production have not manifested themselves significantly, which is demonstrated in the large setbacks in several industrial sectors with a high degree of labor input. The exceptions, like the manufacture of cars and some other products, could not, overall, reverse the still-low competitiveness of engineering production and the consumer industry.

The manufacture of goods declined in comparison with 1992 in all sectors of industry (in organizations with 25 or more employees). The production of goods declined on a year-to-year basis more than 10 percent in mining nonenergy raw materials, the textile and garments industries, wooden goods manufacture, the production and processing of stone and ceramics, and particularly in the manufacture of machines and instruments. Among the other sectors of industry, the lowest production decline was registered in the manufacture of leather and leather goods, the manufacture of rubber goods, and plastic goods production—less than 2 percent each.

The decisive and still-growing share in industrial production belongs to food and condiments manufacture (16.5 percent); power, gas, and water production (10.8 percent); metal and metal goods production (14.3 percent); and vehicle manufacture (8.4 percent). In addition to the aforementioned sectors with a low pace of production, the share of the manufacture of electrical and optical instruments also declined (4.1 percent) so that, together with the manufacture of machines and instruments (share of 7.7 percent) and vehicle production, the share of the former engineering and electrical engineering industries reaches approximately 20 percent.

The small enterprises (with staffs of fewer than 25) and natural persons, registered or not registered in the enterprise register, demonstrated much greater economic activity. According to a Czech Statistical Office estimate, the production of small enterprises and individuals increased by 20 percent on a year-to-year basis, while the production in organizations with more than 25 employees declined by 7.4 percent. The small business managed to increase the volume of output in construction by 1.5 percent, while production in large enterprises declined 10.1 percent.

The relationship between the growth of labor productivity and average wages did not develop favorably. While the GDP declined 1 percent, the average nominal wages in the economy increased by 25 percent and real wages by 3.5 percent; the productivity of labor in industry declined 1.3 percent, while nominal wages rose 23.8 percent and real wages 2.5 percent; and, in construction, the 12.2 percent decline in productivity compares with a 28.6 percent increase in nominal wages and 6.5 percent in real wages (all in comparison of 1993 with 1992).

The rate of inflation reached 20.8 percent in comparison with 1992. It has been affected, from the very beginning of the year, by the transfer to the value-added tax, which was reflected in an 8-percent price increase. If we adjust the rate of inflation, taking away this effect, the inflation trend would reach less than 1 percent per month. While overall consumer prices rose 18.2 percent between December 1992 and December 1993, the prices of food products rose 13.2 percent and nonfood products 18 percent, catering 21.9 percent, and services 25.3 percent. Manufacturing prices in industry rose 11.4 percent; construction 26.9 percent; railroad, river, and air-cargo transport 29.5 percent; communications 28.9 percent; and farm products on average for the year 6.2 percent.

The political stability, continuing the favorable acceptance of the economic reform and the economic development by a majority of the population, and a relatively very low rate of unemployment were the main reasons for social accord. The overall unemployment rate of 3.5 percent indicates that the fundamental material restructuring has not yet begun.

[11 Mar p 3]

[Text] Foreign demand was boosted by undervaluing the rate of exchange of the koruna [Kc], which is almost triple the purchase parity. Exports, excluding exports to Slovakia, rose 20 percent in comparison with 1992; including Slovakia, it grew, according to the estimate, by more than 11 percent. Imports, because of the high volume of imports in 1992 before the currency division, increased 2.7 percent, excluding imports from Slovakia; including the estimate for Slovakia, it would be between 1 and 3 percent lower than in 1992. The 1993 trade balance ended with a surplus of Kc5.9 billion—without Slovakia, with a deficit of Kc3.7 billion.

The favorable development of the real trade relations, which reached the value of 104.1 percent, was achieved by a 2-percent increase of export prices and a reduction of the prices of imported goods by 1.7 percent. Projected into the volumes of exports and imports (without Slovakia), the price changes in 1993 brought Kc12 billion to the Czech economy in comparison with the price levels of 1992.

The largest trading partner was Germany: Its share of imports was 25.1 percent and of exports 26.9 percent.

The surplus on the current account of the balance of payments in convertible currency reached \$620 million (approximately Kc18 billion). The convertible currency trade deficit was made up, and the source of the surplus was the surplus of services and transfers of private and enterprise foreign currency funds. In services, tourism (foreign currency income from foreigners reached \$1.3 billion) and gas transit were the sectors most responsible for the surplus.

Foreign currency reserves in the entire banking system rose at the end of the year to \$6.2 billion, of which the Czech National Bank's foreign currency reserves amounted to Kc3.8 billion. The Czech National Bank's reserves cover a four-month volume of imports of goods and services in convertible currency.

A large part of the increase of foreign currency reserves reflects foreign currency funds drawn from abroad, which, however, also appear on the other side as an increase in gross indebtedness. In addition to the aforementioned surplus on the current account of the balance of payments, it was also the inflow of capital—above all, portfolio investments—that contributed to the increase in foreign currency reserves. Two issues of the Czech National Bank bonds, with a volume of \$0.7 billion, should be mentioned first. Foreign investments in securities on the domestic capital market also increased significantly. Foreign currency credits obtained by domestic firms directly from abroad were also among the sources of long-term capital. The inflow of direct investments from abroad declined in comparison with 1992 to reach \$561 million (the direct investments from abroad for 1992 to 1993 amount to \$2,053 million).

The macroeconomic stability was actively affected in 1993 by the state budget. As opposed to the countries of the former Eastern bloc and most West European countries, the state budget had a surplus of Kc1.1 billion, and that with planned revenues surpassed by 4.6 percent and expenditures by 4.3 percent. The basis of budget revenues was taxes, specifically income tax (Kc71.9 billion), value-added tax and consumer tax (Kc107.5 billion), and social security premiums (Kc106.0 billion).

While the monetary policy of the Czech National Bank was moderately restrictive and careful in early 1993, it relaxed in the second half of the year. The stability of the purchasing power of the koruna prevailed. The rate of exchange against the dollar did not substantially change in the course of the year and hovered about Kc29.15 per

dollar. Money supply rose by 17.5 percent in the course of the year—i.e., it moved more slowly than inflation.

The main reason for the growth of the money supply is the credits provided to the enterprise sector. The credits increased overall by Kc107 billion to reach Kc678 billion at the end of the year. The decline of the share of long-term credits and the concurrent increase in short-term credits were affected by the unclear nature of the development programs, the uncertainty of the management stability, and the worsening financial situation of the enterprises, together with fear on the part of the banks of the growing volume of risk credits, which are estimated at more than one-fifth of total credits. The credit policy was marked by high security for the credits and relatively high credits. The interest rate began to decline after the June reduction of the discount rate from 9.5 percent to 8 percent, but it still is higher than the interest rates charged on credit abroad. Therefore, in late 1993, the inflow of foreign capital in the form of credit became more significant. The volume of deposits increased in 1993 by Kc117 billion to reach Kc636 billion.

The trend in the living standard sphere was characterized in 1993 by a high growth of nominal wages—i.e., 28 percent in comparison with the previous year. Even with the 20.8-percent consumer price increase, the real income of the population rose by 6 percent. Real wages rose by 3.5 percent. In comparison with 1989, the real income of the population was still 15 percent lower.

With the aforementioned average data, the living standard of individual groups and strata of the population began to significantly differentiate according to the per capita income in the applicable household groups.

The demographic development of the Czech Republic was marked, as in the previous several years, by a low natural increase of the population.

Aviation Industry Restructuring Approved

AU1503081794 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 9 Mar 94 p 1

[Article by "tk": "Ministers Gave Green Light to the Program of Restructuring the Aviation Industry"]

[Text] Prague—Yesterday, the Council of Ministers confirmed the plan of restructuring the aviation industry. According to the approved proposal, Aero Prague Co. is to eliminate all of its bank loans and thereby also the risk of bankruptcy. In the final stage, only four subsidiaries will remain in the Aero Holding—Aero Vodochody, Letov Praha, Technometra Radotin, and the Research and Testing Aviation Institute. The National Property Fund will keep 64.8 percent of the holding shares. Aero will hold 53 percent stake in the subsidiaries. The debt clearing will result from the capitalization of the main creditors' claims. The Investicni a Postovni Banka and CSOB [Czechoslovak Foreign Trade Bank] will each purchase 10-percent shares of the holding subsidiaries at 70 percent of the nominal value, and the Konsolidacni banka 27 percent.

The tender for the purchase of majority stakes in Moravan Otrokovice and Motorlet Jinonice is to be evaluated in the near future. The Czech Frut Ovo Co. has offered \$45 million for Motorlet, and the Canadian firm Pratt & Whitney has offered \$1 million cash, \$10 million in the form of know-how and \$14 million in investments. The same Frut Ovo has offered \$800 million for Moravan, while Bata offered only know-how. If the tender for Motorlet is not successful, a competition will be announced. If the talks with the bidders for Moravan are not successful, either, the Investicni a Postovni Banka will purchase the company, and the proceeds will be used to pay the Aero debts. A competition is also being considered for Let Kunovice if a suitable foreign partner is not found.

Yesterday, the ministers also discussed the conditions for the purchase of Czechoslovak Airlines shares from Air France Co. by the Konsolidacni Banka. Minister Karel Dyba observed that the purchase of the French company's stake will also be discussed by the government later today, but he refused to publish any additional information.

Moravcik Views Plans To Form New Government

LD1503151694 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica
Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 15 Mar 94

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] Not every one had the opportunity to listen to the ideas presented in an earlier interview by Jozef Moravcik. We are therefore repeating some of the more important parts of his interview.

[Begin recording] [Moravcik] I am now faced with the most important step, and that is to form the new government. I am fully concentrating on this task.

[Unidentified reporter] Do you already have a concept concerning the composition of the new government?

[Moravcik] Such a concept has been taking shape for some time. I cannot say more about it right now because negotiations with representatives of the parliamentary parties concerned are still going on. The composition of the new government should be completed tomorrow or the day after tomorrow.

[Reporter] When do you want to submit the composition of the government for the president's approval?

[Moravcik] I think this could happen on Wednesday [16 March].

[Reporter] Does it mean that you want the 27th parliamentary session to continue with the new government?

[Moravcik] It would be desirable.

[Reporter] Are you working on your policy statement?

[Moravcik] I will submit the policy statement at the next National Council session.

[Reporter] As a former foreign minister, how do you visualize the person of the future foreign minister?

[Moravcik] I think it should be a career diplomat. I am approaching the issue from this starting point at the moment.

[Reporter] Do you have anyone tipped for this post?

[Moravcik] Naturally, I do.

[Reporter] In your interview for Slobodny Piatok [Free Friday], you said that you were close to the ideas of the Alliance of Democrats of the Slovak Republic. Does that mean that their ideas will determine your course and that you will work with this party?

[Moravcik] We want to create a joint political party.

[Reporter] Does it mean that the party being called the Democratic Union, whose creation has been proposed by Roman Kovac, is going to be the joint party with the Alliance of Democrats? Or are these parties going to be two different political parties and you, in that case, will choose just one of them?

[Moravcik] It is possible that another party will be involved. That means that three or possibly four parties will merge.

[Reporter] Which three or four parties of those you have just mentioned might participate in such a merger?

[Moravcik] Perhaps you should add Cernak [former chairman of the Slovak National Party and founder of the National Democratic parliamentary club] and maybe another body, although that is no more than an idea at the moment. [end recording]

Interviewed on Government Program

LD1503203494 Bratislava STV 1 Television Network in Slovak 1830 GMT 15 Mar 94

[Interview with Prime Minister-designate Jozef Moravcik by an unidentified correspondent; place and date not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Correspondent] [Passage omitted] The previous government decided that state secretaries would leave their posts. Are you going to fill these posts, or will the new ministers abolish the decision made by former ministers?

[Moravcik] This decision made by the government is very unusual and is very strange. I think that our people could and should assess this measure and form their own opinions on the matter. We have not decided yet to rectify this decision made by the government. We want to have proposals this week so that we can fill the posts of state secretaries and heads of offices. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] From the citizens' point of view, the content of government activity will be the priority. What will be the priorities of the government?

[Moravcik] The government will have only a limited period for its activity. The basic trends of its activity are already clear to us. The order in which I am going to list them does not necessarily mean what priority they are given.

The new government will have to secure political stabilization and the calming down of the political scene. It will have to secure the normal operation of state administration and to stop the deterioration in some aspects of its activity. The government will have to focus on the economy because that is important for all other areas. I have said several times already that it is important to stop the negative trends that are becoming clearly visible in the economy, and to lay foundations for the new government to build on these foundations after elections.

[Correspondent] The tasks that you have listed indicate that they will include measures that will be not very attractive to voters. Hence, from the point of view of a

voter, this government may become less interesting. How do you view your role? Is it really going to be only until the next elections?

[Moravcik] We believe that a realistic picture of Slovakia and especially of its economy should be presented. I think that, when a citizen gets such a true view of the reality, he or she will understand measures that are inevitable to secure a certain positive development of society after new elections. [passage omitted]

Offers Names of New Government

LD1603131794 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica
Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 16 Mar 94

[Anna Samelova reports from the Primatial Palace]

[Text] [Passage indistinct] Shortly before 1130, Prime Minister Jozef Moravcik left the room where he had submitted to President Michal Kovac the proposed composition of the government.

I asked Moravcik how the president accepted the proposal.

[Begin recording] [Samelova] Did (he) accept it en bloc or individually?

[Moravcik] He voiced agreement with all of the proposals—that is, he approved the composition of the government that had been submitted to him.

[Samelova] Can you tell us the names of the new government members?

[Moravcik] I ask you to wait until (this afternoon). There will a swearing-in ceremony at Bratislava Castle at 1800.

[Samelova] Last night, after talks with your coalition, you said that as soon as the government was appointed you would have the first extraordinary session of the government on [word indistinct] material and the current privatization process at some ministries. Will there be a government session today?

[Moravcik] We assume that the government will be in session today. [end recording]

The appointment of the new government and the festive swearing-in ceremony will take place at Bratislava Castle at 1800 today. The names of the ministers will not be announced by President Michal Kovac before that time. This was announced to journalists by his spokesman, Anton Bodis.

Michal Kovac Airs Views on Current Issues

LD1503234394

[Editorial Report] Bratislava STV 1 Television Network in Slovak at 2105 GMT on 15 March carries in place of its usual "Press Club" program a 60-minute program entitled "May We Enter, President?" which is usually

scheduled for other days. The program consists of a live discussion between President Michal Kovac and journalists Marian Lesko and Ivan Horsky. The anchorman is not identified.

The first 40 minutes are devoted to a discussion of the president's report on the state of the country presented to parliament on 9 March and Meciar's speech in parliament on 11 March. The president agreed that reactions to his report may vary. This was the first ever report of its kind, and he tried his best to present the real state of affairs. The president then quotes some parts of his report to show that former Prime Minister Meciar misinterpreted him in his speech. The president also responds to other accusations made by former Prime Minister Meciar in the past.

After that, all three participants speculate on whether any government other than that of Meciar could have done better. One of the journalists opines that too much power became concentrated in the hands of one or two politicians. The president then recalls the history of his views on the need for a government of a broad coalition as well as his talks with Prime Minister Meciar related to this issue. He points out the danger of one or two people holding power and being indispensable to the nation. He expresses his belief in the possibility of a broad coalition of several parties because their programs do not differ too much. According to him, this coalition is possible on the condition that the politicians involved are personalities who are able to cooperate. Asked about the names of the nominees for ministerial posts, the president declines to make them public.

Answering a question on what the future government can achieve before the next elections, the president says: "I think we are aware that, first of all, it is necessary to create a calm atmosphere in society, a calm atmosphere in parliament, and good conditions for the work of the government."

"Second, we have to realize that this is a temporary government, a government for a certain period. Assuming that the elections will be held in September or October, the government will work until then. Every realistic person knows what can be achieved in this time."

The president also says that it will be necessary to deal with the memorandum signed between the previous government and the IMF. "It will be necessary to continue some talks. It will be necessary to say quite unambiguously which policies the government will continue to pursue and to give a signal both abroad and at home that the transformation process will continue. The process of developing democratic institutions and creating conditions for our gradual integration into West European structures will continue as well. It will be necessary to express and confirm again our policy toward neighboring countries, to confirm our foreign policy priorities. Most of all, in cooperation with the trade unions, the Association of Employers Unions, and the

others, we need to rethink the inevitable measures to stop some negative phenomena in the economy. We have information that the ministries are, I would not want to call it a disarray, but they certainly are not in good shape. They are not quite prepared for peaceful work. Therefore, as far as the work of state bodies is concerned, we need to take steps in the personnel sphere. We need to give people security."

At the end of the program, the president appeals to the citizens to reassess their behavior in connection with the incidents in which journalists were beaten up.

A journalist asks him: "Certain things happened in the streets of Bratislava yesterday. Four journalists were beaten up. Deputies of ethnic Hungarian parties were attacked the day before. What is your view of these things?"

Kovac replies: "This is obviously aimed at making the president fed up with the situation inasmuch as all this was happening right under my windows. It is very difficult to work under such circumstances. However, I would like to say to those of our citizens who frequent these places that they will not discourage me. They will not force me to resign. On the contrary, this encourages me to hold out. I am ready to go on persuading these groups of citizens as well.

"Still, I would like to appeal to them as well as to other citizens and say to them that, if their goal is to distress the president, their effort is in vain. They will not succeed in achieving that.

"However, in order not to damage the good name of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], not to harm the HZDS chairman [Vladimir Meciar], and not to be a disgrace to the country, they should really try to show both to our people and to foreign journalists that we are a civilized nation, and they should reconsider the culture of their behaviour. They should realize that we have certain mechanisms and constitutional institutions through which a citizen can express his or her will. Elections are one of these institutions. In elections, people can really express their liking for one politician or another.

"I would also like to ask for something else. I do not understand why love, respect, trust, and liking for one politician is linked to hatred for another politician. Why do they have to show disrespect to the president merely because they like Mr. Meciar? There is nothing wrong with their liking Mr. Meciar. I am glad to see that we have people who respect our politicians. However, this does not mean that they have to hate the president or other politicians who have different views. In my opinion, all of this should be taken into account by both the HZDS chairman and other officials of the HZDS. Perhaps they have the opportunity or the influence to address these citizens and to ask them for a better political culture."

HZDS Ex-Deputies Ask Kovac To Resign

AU1503163994 Bratislava REPUBLIKA in Slovak 14 Mar 94 p 3

[Article by REPUBLIKA: "Movement for a Democratic Slovakia Deputies to the Former CSFR Federal Assembly: President Is Calling in Question the Will of Citizens"]

[Text] Spisska Nova Ves—Aware of our decisive measure of responsibility for the founding of the Slovak Republic, we, deputies to the former Federal Assembly for the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] elected in the 1992 elections, issue the following statement on the current situation in society:

Our young Slovak Republic has arrived at a fateful crossroads. This happened on the basis of a carefully thought out and systematic course of action by the president of the Slovak Republic, who, by his address in the National Council of the Slovak Republic, initiated the process of destabilizing the Slovak political scene and a parliamentary crisis, whose outcome is the negation of the results of free and democratic elections. By this unprecedented action, which is without parallel in the history of European parliamentarianism, he exceeded the framework of his constitutional powers. As a result, the further development of our society is getting into the hands of political entities that did not vote for the Constitution and sovereignty and that were never favorably disposed toward the founding of an independent Slovak Republic. This development fills us with serious concern. We follow with the same concern the endeavor by the president of the Slovak Republic to call in question the will of citizens as expressed in their exercising the right of petition.

While we acknowledge the undeniable contribution made by Michal Kovac, president of the Slovak Republic, to the founding of the Slovak Republic, we feel the moral obligation and justification, obtained by the law on the termination of the federation, to appeal to the president's conscience to consider whether his remaining in the post of president of the Slovak Republic is in conformity with the interests of the Slovak Republic.

Government Paper Echoes Sentiment

AU1503164394 Bratislava REPUBLIKA in Slovak 14 Mar 94 p 1

[Commentary by Chief Editor Jan Smolec: "Step Down, Too, Mr. President!"]

[Text] When assessing the political situation in the wake of the no-confidence vote in Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar in his interview for Slovak Television on Saturday [12 March], President Michal Kovac told television viewers: "We are in a democratic state, and a decision made by the majority is thus valid." He asserted, furthermore, that "this certainly does not mean any black mark against parliament in the eyes of our

public." If the deputies and the president himself were convinced about the correctness of this decision, they should have explained it in person to the voters who had assembled in front of parliament and the Primacialny Palace [temporary seat of Slovak president].

Let me remind the president of the majority principle also regarding the assessment of his activity by deputies for the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] to the former CSFR Federal Assembly. He actively cooperated with these deputies for half a year, when dividing the federation. In a statement adopted on Saturday [12 March], the great majority of these deputies said that the Slovak president had destabilized the political scene, initiated a parliamentary crisis, and evidently exceeded the framework of his constitutional powers. Such action by a president is without precedent in the history of European parliamentarianism. Supported by mandates received from their voters, HZDS deputies to the former Federal Assembly appealed to the president's conscience to consider his remaining in the post of president.

How will the president react to the decision of this majority? A government without top political leaders is to be formed in the days to come. Let us apply that principle consistently. Also to the president.

RFE Frequency Withdrawn by Former Minister

LD1603100094 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 0800 GMT 16 Mar 94

[Text] Tension in the Slovak Republic is growing. Our Bratislava correspondent, Renata Havranova, reports in detail:

[Havranova] Listeners who wanted to listen to a Radio Free Europe [RFE] newscast this morning could not find it on the airwaves.

Former Minister Hofbauer has implemented his threat, made after the editors of this radio station were savagely attacked outside the president's office, and withdrew the frequency of Radio Free Europe. This was confirmed to me this morning in a telephone conversation with (Otto Machac), administrator of the Bratislava Office of RFE. He said he had been warned of disconnection as early as Monday, but no one had officially informed him until now. Otto Machac added that the United States, as well as the Munich leadership of RFE, will protest against this step.

The behavior of the outgoing government is very strange. Roman Kovac confirmed to journalists last night that personnel purges are continuing at the ministries, privatization is under way, and certain property is being written off.

According to Roman Kovac, the first step of the new government, which has been complete since last night, will be to open investigations into these unlawful steps on the part of former Prime Minister Meciar and the other members of the former government.

Hungarian Parties on Relations With Cabinet

LD1503162594 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 15 Mar

[Excerpts] The opposition has been very reluctant to take the step and express no confidence in Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar and his government. The watershed came with the speech delivered by President Michal Kovac, which tipped the scales. The unity of opposition was disturbed by the hesitation of the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL], which, until the very last moment, did not exclude cooperation with the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]. This was stated by the vice chairman of the Coexistence [Egyuttelek] Movement, Arpad Duka Zolyomi, whose statement continued to dominate today's press conference. Our radio was represented by Bernard Hornak, who invited Zolyomi to the microphone.

[Begin recording] [Hornak] According to a preliminary agreement of the former opposition parties, politicians representing the [ethnic] Hungarian parties in Slovakia will not appear in the new government. In spite of this, you do support the formation of the new government, which should consist of representatives of the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL], of the so-called center bloc, and of the Christian Democratic Party [KDH].

[Zolyomi] I would like to return to the 26th session of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, where we learned that the emerging broader coalition did not count on our participation. Then we started to discuss under what conditions we were going to support this new government. We defined certain points, certain measures that could be taken in a joint effort with the government. These were very specific matters, out of which a more comprehensive concept was formulated. We therefore want to support this government, provided, of course, that it keeps to our agreement. In such a case, our requests or suggestions should appear in some form in the new government's program.

[Hornak] You mentioned the conditions. What are they?

[Zolyomi] They are concerned with specific matters related, for example, to the recommendations of the Council of Europe, which should put an end to matters that have been dragging on for almost a year. Then, certain questions relate to jurisdiction of local self-governing bodies, to an alternative educational system, and to the local administrative division. Naturally, this government, whose term of office will be limited, is probably not going to deal with this question in depth. [passage omitted]. A further matter to be dealt with is related to reorganizing and creating a new concept of the Council for Nationalities working within the framework of the Slovak Government and, in some way, the matter of minority representation in the civil service. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Carnogursky Views Prospects for New Government

AU1603114694 Vienna KURIER in German 16 Mar 93 p 5

[Interview with Jan Carnogursky, chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement, by Jana Patsch in Bratislava; date not given: "Government of Experts"]

[Text] [Patsch] What will the government be like?

[Carnogursky] It will be a government of experts. No single party chairman is among them. For example, the new foreign minister has experience as a UN ambassador, and the new finance minister is a banking expert.

[Patsch] Will the alliance of the opposition, which has been so much at variance so far, hold?

[Carnogursky] There are, of course, different views within the government. But all know what is at stake. We have a joint objective....

[Patsch] ...the elimination of Meciar?

[Carnogursky] Above all, the future of our country. Moreover, I believe that it might work better than many assume. Peter Weiss (chairman of the Party of the Democratic Left—SDL) is a man with whom one can have a reasonable talk. At any rate, I am optimistic.

[Patsch] How can early new elections be pushed through?

[Carnogursky] This is difficult because the Constitution does not provide for it. Basically, we are sticking to our point of view: new elections in September or October. We would need a three-fifths' majority for it. If Meciar rejects our proposal, we have to look for another way. It would be conceivable to ask the president to open the road to new elections by a referendum. It should contain only one question: early elections—yes or no?

[Patsch] A referendum has already been initiated by Meciar....

[Carnogursky] ... which does not meet the requirements. Signatures turn up two and three times. There are names on the list that are not registered anywhere.

Comments on Meciar's Replacement

AU1603124794 Bratislava SME in Slovak
12 Mar 94 p 1

[Interview with Jan Carnogursky, chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement, by Jana Pankovcinova; place and date not given: "Meciar Did Not Convince Me"]

[Text] [Pankovcinova] How do you assess the prime minister's speech in the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR], his offers regarding a solution to the domestic political situation, and his statement that he would be ready to step down one minute after the president does?

[Carnogursky] The speech was general and did not address those parts of the president's speech that described the actually existing negative features of Slovak politics. Moreover, he tried to give himself the air of someone who has been fighting for Slovak statehood since time immemorial. I, however, remember the meeting in the Vikarka restaurant [at Prague Castle] in January 1991, when he signed all points on the future constitutional setup submitted by President Vaclav Havel. The prime minister said that matters raised only in one-to-one conversations between himself and the president should not be made public. Yet this is exactly what he himself did last year with regard to his talks with Ludovit Cernak, the then chairman of the Slovak National Party [allusion to Meciar's claim that, in a private conversation, Cernak had asked for funds from the state budget for his party]. Vladimir Meciar simply did not convince me. As for his proposal that he will step down one minute after the president tenders his resignation, this is sheer demagoguery because, if the president of the Slovak Republic resigned, there would be no one to accept the prime minister's resignation.

[Pankovcinova] Olga Keltosova, minister of labor and social affairs, called on deputies on Thursday [10 March] to consider the possibilities arising from Article 106 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic. This article deals with conditions under which the NRSR can recall the president....

[Carnogursky] This was a display of demagoguery and arrogance because, by proposing a broad-coalition government, the president did not make himself guilty of anything [constituting grounds for impeachment] under Article 106 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic. The very fact that a minister dares say anything of that sort about the president is brazen.

[Pankovcinova] How long will the formation of the coalition government last?

[Carnogursky] It cannot last long. The government must be formed within the next few days.

[Pankovcinova] Will you seek a change in the post of NRSR chairman?

[Carnogursky] I think that this issue will be topical.

[Pankovcinova] Are you personally interested in any government post?

[Carnogursky] No, it will be a government without party leaders.

[Pankovcinova] Which government departments does the Christian Democratic Movement intend to fill?

[Carnogursky] That is a matter for political parties to agree upon.

SDL Discusses Party Strategy in Crisis

AU1503150894 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 14 Mar 94 p 2

[Article by "ao": "Priority—Early Elections"]

[Text] Bratislava—The Saturday [12 March] meeting of the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] Executive Committee started with an evaluation of the political situation and an assessment of the ability of the SDL district organizations in Povazska Bystrica and Ziar nad Hronom to act. The participants' main attention focused, however, on the development of the domestic political situation in Slovakia.

The Executive Committee approved the course of action by the SDL Presidium and the SDL Club of Deputies in the search for a way out of the political crisis. It continues to regard an agreement on calling early elections as the priority of the SDL's tactics so that the new cabinet's period of activity can be strictly defined. The Executive Committee authorized the SDL Presidium to conduct talks on the formation of a preelection coalition with the Social Democratic Party in Slovakia [SDSS], the Farmers Movement of the Slovak Republic, the Association of Workers of Slovakia, the Green Party in Slovakia, and other political entities, as well as on the formation of a provisional government. The SDL is interested in the new government having the greatest possible degree of continuity with the previous one.

At a meeting with reporters, SDL Chairman Peter Weiss said that he was opposed to the assumption of power by the new coalition being accompanied by politically expedient purges at various levels. As for posts in the Supreme Inspection Office [NKU] of the Slovak Republic, SDL Deputy Chairman Milan Ftacnik said that the NKU was the fourth institution of constitutional power. Changes in its leadership are essential, he said, precisely because the NKU chairman (from the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia) and the deputy chairmen (both from the Slovak National Party) did not act independently in their posts.

Responding to behind-the-scenes rumors about a lack of unity among SDL deputies to the National Council of the Slovak Republic, Peter Weiss said that their activity was determined by the president's [9 March] address to parliament and by the failure to enlist a sufficient number of deputies' votes to decide on a date for early elections before the dismissal of Prime Minister Meciar. Hence, the problem was not just to express no confidence in the prime minister, but to agree on a sequence of steps. However, the SDL Club of Deputies' decision of Friday [11 March] afternoon [to support the no-confidence vote in Meciar] was unanimous. Peter Weiss did not rule out the possibility that, apart from a broad coalition government, there could also be a cabinet formed by the SDL and the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, naturally without Vladimir Meciar. As regards representatives of the Hungarian political parties, the

SDL does not count on their direct participation in the formation of a provisional government.

New Balance of Forces in Parliament Reviewed

AU1503145894 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 14 Mar 94 p 3

[TA SR report: "Positions After Parliamentary Reshuffles; Changes in the National Council of the Slovak Republic Deputies' Clubs"]

[Text] The decision by parliament to pass a vote of no-confidence in Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar will, possibly, still in the course of the 27th meeting of the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR], trigger changes in the composition of deputies' clubs.

Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] Chairman Vladimir Meciar, who did not exercise his mandate as a deputy in view of holding the post of Slovak prime minister, is likely to be the first to return to the parliamentary benches. He will replace Anna Koruliakova from Cadca, who, together with deputy Milan Mrenko, set up the HZDS National Social Democratic Faction. The Cadca HZDS District Presidium did not accept this initiative.

[Justice Minister] Katarina Tothova, [Labor and Social Affairs Minister] Olga Keltosova, [Deputy Prime Minister] Jozef Prokes, and [Deputy Prime Minister] Marian Andel also did not exercise their mandates as deputies while executing their [government] posts. Vladimir Mikulka from Ruzomberok, Blazena Pavlovicova from Skalica, Miroslav Rybansky from Piestany, and Milan Janicina from Bratislava, who subsequently joined Ludovit Cernak's National Democratic Club, had been co-opted into the NRSR in their stead.

At the start of the 10th electoral term [in June 1992], the HZDS had 74 deputies in the NRSR, the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] 29, the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] 18, the Slovak National Party [SNS] 15, and the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement/Coexistence [MKDH/Coexistence] coalition 14.

In the course of parliament's 10th electoral term, 19 deputies have left the HZDS Deputies' Club, one has left the SDL Deputies' Club, and seven have left the SNS Deputies' Club. The KDH and MKDH/Coexistence clubs have remained unchanged. Until the NRSR meeting started, the correlation of votes between the HZDS/SNS government coalition on the one hand and opposition parties and independent deputies on the other was 74:76. In the course of the 27th NRSR meeting, Imrich Mori announced that he was leaving the HZDS, and eight signatories of the Alternative of Political Realism [platform within the HZDS] announced that they were leaving the HZDS Deputies' Club. This new balance of forces apparently decided on the passage of the no-confidence vote in the prime minister.

After the [former] Slovak Government members regain their mandates as NRSR deputies, the HZDS will have 52 seats in parliament and the SNS nine. The previously two independent deputies—Ivan Hudec and Peter Brnak—have been joined by others, following the departures from the HZDS and the SNS. Hence, the correlation of votes should be 65:85 in favor of independent deputies and political parties that will try, in the coming days, to form a government with a limited term of office, until early parliamentary elections.

New Party To Represent Workers' Interests

AU1503164294 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 14 Mar 94 p 2

[Article by "js": "Workers Have Their Own Party; Civic Association Transformed Into Political Party"]

[Text] Banska Bystrica—The Association of the Workers of Slovakia [Zdruzenie robotnikov Slovenska, ZRS] will contest the early parliamentary elections as an independent representative of the most numerous social layer of the population—workers and farmers. This was announced by ZRS Chairman Jan Luptak, deputy to the National Council of the Slovak Republic for the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL], in Banska Bystrica on Saturday [12 March], immediately after delegates to the Third ZRS Assembly approved, by an absolute majority of votes, the transformation of the ZRS, which has until now been a civic association, into a political party.

The delegates confirmed Jan Luptak as chairman of this new left-wing party, which has 13,000 members. Jan Luptak stressed that, in a public opinion survey, as many as 85 percent of 1,264 respondents said that they would support the ZRS with their vote in the coming parliamentary elections. According to Luptak, this optimistic election forecast is based on the fact that workers' interests have so far been represented by political parties only haphazardly and expediently, whereas the ZRS bases its program on a systematic solution to the problems of people who are the greatest victims of economic reform. After the elections, the new political party intends to cooperate with the SDL and the Social Democratic Party in Slovakia [SDSS] and plans, among other issues, to initiate changes to legislation that is, in the opinion of the ZRS, directed against workers. This concerns, in particular, the Labor Code and the Law on Wages and Supplementary Payments. Within a short period of time, the party will address its potential voters by its own weekly—HLAS ROBOTNIKOV [Workers' Voice]. Both the editorial staff and the ZRS central bodies will be headquartered in Banska Bystrica.

[Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK in Slovak on 14 March on page 2 carries a 300-word TA SR report on the ZRS congress, which specifies that the "public opinion poll" referred to by Jan Luptak was organized by the ZRS itself and that it was conducted "chiefly among blue-collar workers."]

NATO Official Cited on AWACS, Serb Planes

LD1603100194 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0600 GMT 16 Mar 94

[Text] A high-ranking NATO officer has confirmed that the AWACS planes patrolling in Hungary's airspace contributed to the shooting down two weeks ago of four Serb aircraft that had violated the UN air exclusion zone over Bosnia.

The NATO European Command's deputy chief of staff responsible for operations said that NATO was not surprised when Budapest asked that no AWACS planes should be in Hungarian airspace at a time of a potential NATO air strikes in Bosnia. However, in order to have effective intelligence it was necessary for NATO to obtain data from the AWACS planes located over Hungary.

The general also said that NATO was in constant radio contact with Hungarian Government organs and the Hungarian military air defense leadership.

MDF Chairman Argues Case for Election

AU1503095794 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 14 Mar p 11

[Interview with Lajos Fur, defense minister and chairman of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, by Dezso Pinter; place and date not given: "The Opposition Is Also To Blame for the Silence of the Majority"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Pinter] What, in your view, are the effects on society of the events at Hungarian Radio?

[Fur] Visibly and regrettably, the developments in the radio have an impact on political life. However, they certainly do not have any effect on society. Dealing with these kinds of internal affairs of an institution is the least of society's problems. As for the allegation that the government is behind the dismissals, I have to refute it most firmly.

[Pinter] What is your reaction to the view that, since you were elected party chairman, you have subordinated all your political activities exclusively to the propaganda of success?

[Fur] This view is unfounded and unjust. We are in a period of assessment and we should not tolerate a situation in which only our failures and mistakes are revealed to society. This is not because it hurts us but because it creates a distorted image, and only provides the voters with a basis for drawing the wrong conclusions. Noisily and with demagogic methods rather than arguments, our competitors are trying to take away from us even those results that can be proved to have been achieved by us since 1990. The barrage has persisted since the moment our government took office, and it has had some effects. Our period of being defensive has ended. We are not just advertising our successes, we are

providing information about the facts. The economic decline began at the beginning of the 1980's—partly as a result of the radical change of external circumstances, the south Slav war and the embargo, and the difficulties that went with the change of regime—it accelerated from 1990, but we cannot talk about a slump. The year 1993 was the turning point. At the moment, we can only talk about some development in comparison with the beginning of the decline but this does not yet mean the rise of the nation. The favorable tendencies of 1993 are continuing in 1994. A 6 to 7 percent inflation was projected for January but the actual figure was 3.2 percent. This is a fact. For some people, stating this fact is the same as the propaganda of success, but for us, it is proof that we are following the correct road.

[Pinter] Is it also not a fact that there are many people in this country who have been left to fend for themselves and are stumbling along this road with ever greater difficulty?

[Fur] It is. However, encouragement supported by the facts is also meant for those who, as a result of their increasingly desperate living conditions, feel that this government coalition or this system has left them on their own. We do not want to make the situation look better than it is, because it also is depressing for us, but it is not paralyzing. We must not talk about hopelessness.

[Pinter] Have you formed an opinion on the campaign behavior of other parties?

[Fur] The opposition is mainly trying to gain social support by damaging our reputation. They want to blame us for all the troubles of the transformation. The favorite statement of the Hungarian Socialist Party's [MSZP] chairman [Gyula Horn] is that this government was characterized by unprecedented dilettantism. Says he, who was formerly part of the power that was almost completely unable to do anything to stop and reverse the damaging processes. Under the rule of their great expertise, only the negative things were accumulated. However, what is really dangerous is that many people are making irresponsible promises to the nation. Should they get into government, it would soon be discovered that they have misled society, and this would result in a formerly unseen—mainly moral and economic—crisis for the country. Chaos could reappear where there should be order.

[Pinter] Do you link the danger of this chaos with the fact that various ideologies are gaining ground?

[Fur] The unshakably left-wing and liberal ideology that is created at writing desks will prove to be a restraint on social development. During the decades of socialism, we had the chance to experience the true meaning of ideological obsession. An invented theoretical system was forced onto reality. I caution the country against a power whose thinking is so much within theoretical limits. It is to be feared that the representatives of a power like this would follow the example of the Bourbons and we will find that they have not learned or forgotten anything.

[Pinter] According to many surveys, the left wing has gained significant support in recent months. When you formulate your sharp criticism, are you not worried that, because of the terms you use, you will find yourself irrevocably opposed to the section of society that supports the left wing?

[Fur] My intention is completely different. I certainly do not want to get into a conflict with anyone. As a believer, I do not have hatred for anyone. It is always the political thoughts and mentality that I criticize. I am concerned for the country in case the left wing comes to power. This danger exists because, after four decades of dictatorship, this way of thinking—and please do not forget: organization—has its traces in society.

[Pinter] Do you hope that the election campaign and your arguments will change this?

[Fur] Undoubtedly, I believe in the power of words, and that the expression of various realizations can divert thinking people in the right direction. I am aware that people who have very much committed themselves to the joint political action of the MSZP and the trade unions, or the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ], which is drawing closer to the left wing double quick, will not be much influenced by my arguments. It is almost as important, however, to win the silent majority to ourselves. They make up 50 percent of society in Hungary. [passage omitted] They will decide the fate of the elections and what side the country, which is unfortunately still very quiet, will take. [passage omitted]

[Pinter] While you are constantly warning the country against expecting miracles, is it not possible that the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] is expecting a miracle as far as its own fate is concerned?

[Fur] The only thing we trust in is that the country will appreciate our results and efforts. There are encouraging signs for this.

[Pinter] Are there any signs of this that you deliberately do not talk about?

[Fur] We do not have secrets.

[Pinter] In your view, how successfully are the MDF politicians, who face the country's public, serving the intention to gain more ground?

[Fur] The MDF's national committee does not necessarily agree completely with all statements. However, I am not aware of major deviations. The slight differences, on the other hand, are explicitly useful. For example, the MDF's liberal, Christian, and conservative wings are still mentioned. I find the term conservative more acceptable than populist-national, which has been torn to shreds.

[Pinter] Do these tendencies actually exist?

[Fur] They do not exist as political tendencies. However, we can say that our members have different ideological

sources of thought. Some were more affected by national liberalism, others by Christian democracy, or conservatism. [passage omitted]

[Pinter] Do you have any contact with Istvan Csurka [co-chairman of the Hungarian Justice and Life Party, MIEP]?

[Fur] I do not.

[Pinter] And with the MIEP?

[Fur] No.

[Pinter] Do you see this the only natural state of affairs?

[Fur] I do.

[Pinter] Does your answer also mean that, regardless of the election results and the political situation that arises afterwards, there can be no common road for the MDF and the MIEP?

[Fur] It is impossible for this kind of road to exist. The MIEP is attacking us in an astonishing style. It is outright shocking that Csurka and Jozsef Torgyan [chairman of the Independent Smallholders Party] participated in a joint demonstration in the Sports Hall.

[Pinter] Was it this fact that shocked you or what was said there?

[Fur] The fact that this joint appearance took place. What the participants said was nothing new. In the past, we already had the chance to be shocked at what they had to say.

[Pinter] In your view, is Csurka's and Torgyan's supporting camp growing?

[Fur] Not at all. The followers come from a narrow social group. Many of them are unable to process their injuries or are psychologically broken, perhaps misled people.

[Pinter] Are you sure that the MDF membership has the same views on Csurka's and Torgyan's politics and supporters?

[Fur] If there had been any supporters of these people in our party, they would have left us and joined Csurka's and Torgyan's parties. The unity and atmosphere of our seventh national meeting should have convinced the doubters and those who are sincerely concerned about our political line. Not one of the 720 deputies who gathered there appeared as a supporter of undesirable tendencies.

[Pinter] After the national meeting and your election as party chairman, is your cooperation with Prime Minister Peter Boross changing in any way?

[Fur] Only in the sense that our cooperation is even stronger. I can say the same about [Deputy Chairman] Sandor Lezsak, the other key character in our party. These three people are operating without any problems. We will take care to keep it this way. [passage omitted]

[Pinter] What do Boross's prime ministerial activities so far mean for the MDF?

[Fur] A huge gain. Boross has brought a powerful pragmatism into governing and politics in general. His legal training and experience as a company leader make him very well informed in the details of state administration. The membership expects a lot of him.

[Pinter] What is your reaction to the loose and not very clearly defined election cooperations?

[Fur] With some reservation and acknowledgment. The left wing has obviously sorted itself out, while there is much uncertainty at the liberals. We are not certain if the SZDSZ is one of the left-wing parties. It shows itself to be one because it is getting increasingly close to the idea of forming a coalition with the MSZP. It is strange because a liberal party by no means can belong to the left wing. I wonder if the supporter of a social-liberal model can belong to the liberal bloc.

[Pinter] Do you also have doubts about the line of the Federation of Young Democrats [Fidesz]?

[Fur] Not at all. There have been serious changes in the Fidesz, the supporters of the social-liberal solution have left the party.

[Pinter] In a situation when the coalition is being planned, has this made the Fidesz a more attractive party for you?

[Fur] I can answer this when I see the election results. In my view, a regular dialogue on various practical issues is certainly possible. This could be very useful in the remaining period of parliament.

[Pinter] Have you been surprised by the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] statements in connection with the MDF in the campaign?

[Fur] I do not think it is right to try to blame the MDF for the corrupt practices in privatization. They have also made some other badly worded criticisms. Regardless of this, the two parties, which are in close relationship, often fight for completely identical goals.

[Pinter] Could relations between the MDF and the KDNP become tense in the fight for votes?

[Fur] No. We see this campaign as a running race, rather than a boxing match.

[Pinter] Does this understanding apply to all participants?

[Fur] It certainly applies to the current coalition partners. [passage omitted]

[Pinter] Are you not preparing to continue your activities in opposition after the elections?

[Fur] This possibility does not exist in my conscious mind, it might exist in my subconscious at most. On the basis of what I can see now, I say that we will succeed. [passage omitted]

[Pinter] Do you expect we will have a parliament that can give a stable government to the country until 1998?

[Fur] Only if the calm and sober political forces get the majority. All other solutions hold out the danger of a standstill and anarchy. We should not upset the country.

[Pinter] Do you think that this is what would happen if the current opposition came to power?

[Fur] I do, equally in politics and the economy. The country cannot take this risk.

Pawlak's Talks With Russian Counterpart Noted

WS1603124294 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
16 Mar 94 pp 1, 23

[Article by Slawomir Popowski from Moscow: "Optimism Without Specifics; Another Meeting Between Polish and Russian Prime Ministers in May"]

[Text] *The "face-to-face" conversation between Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and Polish Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak lasted much longer than expected during Pawlak's working visit to Moscow. If one were to believe the chiefs of governments, the visit's most important goal was achieved: Problems that are obstacles to economic cooperation were defined with precision, while individual ministers were obliged to come up with proposals for solutions by May of this year. The prime ministers for both countries will meet again in two months—it is very likely that this time the meeting will take place in Warsaw—in order to sign the necessary agreements.*

It seems that both politicians were interested in breaking the impediments that have been in effect for many months now, in economic relations between Poland and Russia. According to Viktor Chernomyrdin, the situation requires a speeding up of work on putting financial problems in order, on working out new payment mechanisms, and on regulating the issue of mutual indebtedness.

Prime Minister Pawlak was also full of optimism. In his view, thanks to the cooperation between the two governments, a prospect for signing trade agreements for years to come is realistic, including signing a trade protocol before the end of this year. The most important issue, said the Polish government's chief during a short meeting with journalists, is that the declarations and agreements signed earlier actually be implemented. That is indeed the essence of a "Partnership for Development" concept proposed by the Polish Government. The point is to create conditions that would make it possible to establish practical cooperation among countries and nations.

While responding to a question pertaining to the resolution of a key issue within Polish-Russian economic cooperation—that is, the issue of indebtedness—Prime Minister Pawlak said the issue will be further debated by experts. Old debts should in no way be an obstacle to current cooperation. Viktor Chernomyrdin shared that view. Economy Minister Aleksandr Shokhin was more skeptical. According to him, solving the problem of mutual indebtedness requires a political decision at the level of prime ministers or perhaps even at the level of presidents. After negotiations with the two previous Polish cabinets, which lasted years, a few more compromise solutions must be worked out, to be able to eventually "finalize the issue." Henryk Chmielek, secretary of state in the Finance Ministry, said that both sides have agreed to apply the payment mechanism used in talks with the Paris Club.

At the end of the Polish-Russian talks, which were conducted in the rebuilt wing of the "White House" (old headquarters of the Supreme Council), where Chernomyrdin's Cabinet has moved, both prime ministers signed two agreements: regarding employing Russians in Poland and employing Poles in Russia, and an agreement on cooperation regarding antitrust policies. An agreement on agriculture was also signed.

During the meeting between the prime ministers in May, the following agreements may be signed: regarding military and technical cooperation (this allegedly is supposed to be on cooperation among arms factories, with third markets in mind), on joint transportation ventures (Berlin-Warsaw-Moscow highway and railway), and on a Russia-Europe natural gas pipeline.

After his return from Moscow, Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak said that President Lech Walesa will be the first to hear from him regarding the results of Pawlak's conversations with Russian politicians. According to the government's chief, the most important part of the visit was about determining a time frame for subsequent contacts aimed at signing an agreement on supplies of strategic raw materials that would last for many years. According to Marek Pol, minister of industry and trade, there is a chance for signing an agreement concerning pipeline construction. That venture would be financed exclusively by Polish and Russian companies.

—by M. W.

Discusses Outcome of Meeting

LD1503171194 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1300 GMT 15 Mar 94

[Text] [Announcer] A visit to Poland by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin in May; a protocol on this year's cooperation in two weeks' time; the completion of work on a long-term agreement on economic cooperation in May—these are the results of Polish-Russian talks that ended in Moscow. Correspondent Viktor Siezieniewski reports:

[Siezieniewski] Waldemar Pawlak and Viktor Chernomyrdin's talks lasted longer than scheduled. As both underscored later, it had been a very concrete dialogue of partners interested in breaking the impasse in economic relations. The heads of government did not conceal their satisfaction at the course of the negotiations. I asked Waldemar Pawlak for details.

[Begin recording] [Pawlak] We focussed on actions that could bring quick and measurable advantages. Among the long-term actions, it is worth mentioning the prospects for signing a long-term agreement on economic cooperation. It might yield a protocol of agreements for 1994 even this year [as heard], including financial solutions for servicing our cooperation.

In the more distant future, there are solutions that, through the activities of our governments, can contribute to the expansion of cooperation between specific enterprises and people, from cooperation in banking and finance, through the building of the infrastructure of transport, railways, highways, and communications, to cooperation concerning strategic raw materials, including the construction of a pipeline for transporting Russian gas to Western Europe. These are the big ventures on which the activities of the governments are to focus in order to create conditions for meetings and contacts at all levels. This would be the practical implementation of our idea, put forward at the beginning of this year, for the partnership for development and multidirectional foreign policy.

[Siezieniewski] Did you find a partner in Prime Minister Chernomyrdin?

[Pawlak] Yes. We have already decided on a concrete working schedule for particular ministries aimed at reaching practical decisions that will contribute to the expansion of cooperation. We both agreed that the time wasted could not be made up in the future.

[Siezieniewski] When will the next meeting be held?

[Pawlak] Prime Minister Chernomyrdin will visit Poland in May. Then we will take further steps to make our cooperation at all levels easier. [end recording]

PKOPW Objects to Polish-Lithuanian Treaty

LD1503182394 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1500 GMT 15 Mar 94

[Excerpt] Warsaw, 15 Mar—The Civic Committee for the Defense of Poles in the Vilnius Area [OKOPW] believes that the already approved text of the Polish-Lithuanian Treaty strikes against Polish reasons of state and does not protect the interests of Poles in Lithuania. According to Grzegorz Dziemidowicz, press spokesman of the MSZ [Foreign Affairs Ministry], for the time being, the text of the treaty is secret, and, until it is initialled by the foreign affairs ministers of both states, the MSZ will not say anything about the issue.

OKOPW Chairman Ryszard Szawlowski said at a news conference in Warsaw today that there were reservations about both the preamble to the treaty and the lack of provisions protecting the interests of Poles resident in Lithuania. Although, in accordance with earlier announcements, no persons or dates are mentioned in the preamble, according to him, its provisions clearly refer to specific historical events.

The statement about the tragic past and losses of both peoples caused by the Nazi totalitarianism means that the MSZ is giving the Lithuanians "false moral testimony."

According to the committee, through their policies toward the local Poles, the Lithuanian authorities violate international standards and decisions contained in the

Polish-Lithuanian Declaration, while the present text of the treaty "gives the Lithuanian authorities an instrument to morally finish off the Poles in Lithuania." The Polish authorities have not bothered to ensure that the treaty contains provisions protecting the interests of the 300,000 Poles in Lithuania, including the return of land to Polish farmers or property to public organizations, nor is there an entry concerning a Polish university in Vilnius.

The treaty is to be initialled next Friday [18 March], during Lithuanian Foreign Affairs Minister Povilas Gylys's visit to Warsaw. The committee representatives said they found out the text of the treaty from "reliable sources" in the Vilnius area. They told journalists that they had talked about the treaty with Deputy Prime Minister Aleksander Luczak but that he did not say anything about its possible renegotiation. [passage omitted]

Kolodziejczyk To Choose Own Vice Minister

PM1503093094 Krakow CZAS KRAKOWSKI in Polish 5-6 Mar 94 p 2

[Article by Marek Chorabik: "I Will Choose My Vice Minister Myself, Minister Kolodziejczyk Says on His Return From Paris"]

[Text] "I am open to the coalition's proposals concerning the choice of [defense] vice minister. However, I will not accept a political commissar. I need a man who will be well briefed for the job in substantive terms," Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk said yesterday in Gdynia in reply to questions about the appointment of a candidate to the post of vice minister at the National Defense Ministry [MON].

Kolodziejczyk did not confirm the report that Zbigniew Siemiatkowski, currently press spokesman for the Democratic Left Alliance, has been put forward as a possible candidate.

The MON chief stated that the matter will be the subject of his meeting with representatives of the government coalition, scheduled to take place during the coming week. Kolodziejczyk expected that the coalition would put forward several candidates, from among whom he would select the person most suitable for the post.

The immediate reason for calling the meeting between Piotr Kolodziejczyk and reporters was the conclusion of the trilateral talks between defense ministers of France, Germany, and Poland, which took place in Paris on Thursday night and Friday morning. "We achieved more than we had expected to achieve," Minister Kolodziejczyk said, clearly pleased with the outcome of the Paris meeting. "We gained powerful sponsors, who will promote our position in our efforts to join the Western European Union." Kolodziejczyk expressed his conviction that Poland will be an associate member of the Union as early as in May.

Kolodziejczyk also believed that the change in both Germany's and France's attitude to Poland and its position in Central Europe was a positive aspect of his meeting with Ministers Volker Ruehe and Francois Leotard. According to the head of the Polish defense sector, Poland at long last has a real chance to "emerge from the gray zone and find itself in a zone whose colors are identical with the rest of Europe."

One of the more immediately tangible results Minister Kolodziejczyk brought with him from Paris is the agreement on calling joint staff exercises and joint maneuvers of basic military units. To begin with, these will involve exercises for highland and Alpine riflemen on Polish territory (in the Carpathian Mountains) and in France.

Mazowiecki, Kuron on Future of Merged UD-KLD

PM1603093894 Poznan GAZETA POZNANSKA in Polish 7 Mar 94 pp 1-2

[PAP report by "Ziel": "Fiasco Averted: Mazowiecki Says He Changed His Mind"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Mazowiecki expressed the hope that the new party [created by merging the Democratic Union (UD) and the Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD)] would be "marked by organizational efficiency" and "free from the crisis and paralysis that has been crippling the UD for months." The new group is conceived as an alternative to the political configuration currently in force.

Kuron's Dilemmas

Jacek Kuron revealed that he would join the new party, designed to emerge from the UD and KLD fusion, only if it declared itself firmly in favor of economic effectiveness. However, that goal should be realized on the basis of general public support. Kuron insisted that the conflict between public expectations and the requirements of rational economics was the main reason for the collapse of political authorities.

There Are Some With Whom We Cannot Share the Same Path

The principles of the new party's statute do not provide for the existence of separate factions within the group. The Congress received this clause with many reservations. Ecological Faction chairman Radoslaw Gawlik even went so far as to call it "antidemocratic, politically stupid, and potentially explosive for the Union."

Social-Liberal Faction chairman Zofia Kuratowska was more circumspect in her opinions. Yet even she warned against the danger that the party might now lose many members who had originally joined the UD because they identified themselves with a particular UD faction. Kuratowska was even more concerned about possible membership losses that may be incurred by the fusion with the KLD. "In some regions," she stressed, "there

are particular KLD members with whom we would not sit at the same table." Factional divisions and their associated difficulties manifested themselves early enough, making it impossible for Congress delegates assembled in the hall to sing "Happy Birthday" to Bronislaw Geremek: Each table sang in a different key and to a different tempo.

More on UD Decision To Merge

PM1503154694 Krakow GAZETA KRAKOWSKA in Polish 7 Mar 94 pp 1-2

[Article by Leslaw Maleszka: "Third UD Congress: Stitching Together What Has Unraveled"]

[Text] By an overwhelming majority of votes, the Third Democratic Union [UD] Congress adopted a declaration on joining forces with the Liberal Democratic Congress. The unification congress of the two parties will take place toward the end of April.

There were 318 delegates voting in favor of the union, four who voted against, and 27 who abstained from casting their votes. Suggestions of a name to be given to the eventual new party included such propositions as "Liberal Democratic Union," "Democratic Congress," and "New Democracy."

Fortunately, attempts to avert a major conflict that threatened to "blow up" the Congress ended in a successful resolution of the underlying problem just a dozen or so hours before the official opening of the deliberations. During a session of the UD presidium that lasted from late Friday night through the early hours of Saturday, Tadeusz Mazowiecki agreed to stay on as UD chairman and to run as candidate in the forthcoming election of the leader of the new united party. Everyone joined in persuading Mazowiecki to stay: Bronislaw Geremek, Wladyslaw Frasyniuk, Jan Rokita, and other parliament members collected signatures on an open petition concerning this matter, while local UD circles kept sending in telex messages in support of Mazowiecki's continuing chairmanship. Finally, Mazowiecki decided to stay out—and was applauded by the assembled delegates in a standing ovation. He replied with a concluding address in which he firmly demanded strict loyalty from all of the leaders of the individual UD factions. "Maybe I really am too slow, and maybe I do indeed need to be prompted into acting, but this can be done internally within the party rather than through outside manipulation. I would prefer other ways of finding out about a whole variety of controversial utterances made by my colleagues than coming across them as I listen to broadcasts of radio programs.

It is true that Mazowiecki plays the role of "middleman," or mediator in UD: He reconciles sides and settles conflicts when it comes to program-oriented and tactical differences between the party's right wing (represented by Rokita) and the left wing (headed by Frasyniuk). In internal "Unionese" language, Mazowiecki is sometimes

dubbed "Paper Clip" or "Safety Pin," to denote his ability to pin back together what has become unraveled.

UD Congress Program Debate

There are really no substantive differences over party program between supporters of the number of separate factions within UD. Faction leaders were unanimous on this point, regardless of the fact that they had earlier—sometimes as recently as a few days before the Congress—insisted that a split in the party was inevitable.

Marek Dabrowski emphasized the need to present an integrated vision of a social and economic program. Jacek Kuron asserted that UD faced an obvious dilemma between the concept of a rational economic policy and the need to demonstrate sensitivity to social needs and expectations. The way out of this dilemma can only be through social movements galvanizing citizens to engage in a reform program, and certainly not a war waged against the state budget by the trade unions.

The final Congress declaration was formulated along similar lines: Social discontent was caused by the left-wing coalition's failure to realize the promises it had made during the election campaign as well as from the lack of a clear-cut concept of the necessary reforms. Nevertheless, social conflicts should be resolved at a debating table rather than through organized strikes.

UD radicals engaging in strong campaigns against the Catholic Church took a rapping across the knuckles. Jerzy Turowicz argued that anticlericalism engendered unnecessary conflicts in a situation where even the church itself, through the words of such authorities as John Paul II or Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek, secretary to the Polish Episcopate, supports the idea that a state should officially adopt a neutral worldview. A most forceful line of argument tackling the same subject was put forward by Aleksander Smolar: "Various politicians, mostly more popular than eminent, have misrepresented UD's real position through their utterances on church-state relations. There are limits to such misrepresentation, and those who overstep them should look for suitable niches for themselves outside UD."

Smolar's words were interpreted by the audience as an allusion to some recent statements by Barbara Labuda referring to "creeping clericalization of the state." The culprit herself failed to reply to the challenge. She was absent from the debating hall throughout the second day of the Congress.

Implications of Merger Viewed

PM1503154094 Gdansk DZIENNIK BALTYCKI in
Polish 5-6 Mar 94 p 2

[Article by Barbara Szczepula: "Tusk Wants Balcerowicz: Situation Before UD-KLD Fusion"]

[Text] The Liberals are worried by recent reports that Tadeusz Mazowiecki intends to resign from running as candidate chairman of the proposed new party alliance

between the Liberal Democratic Congress [KLD] and the Democratic Union [UD]. According to [KLD chairman] Donald Tusk, Mazowiecki would guarantee a successful fusion—that is, a union between the two parties in their entirety—better than any other candidate. Tusk has expressed his hope that UD would consult its recommendations for new candidate leaders with the KLD. Moreover, he let it be understood that the KLD would not support Wladyslaw Frasyniuk as candidate to the post.

Instead, he himself suggested a preferred KLD candidate. He is Leszek Balcerowicz. The only trouble is that Balcerowicz, who, incidentally, does not belong to any party, has so far failed to indicate in any way whether he would be willing to accept such an offer.

During a press conference convened in Warsaw before the opening of the Democratic Union's Third Congress, due to begin today, Donald Tusk presented those assembled with the fundamentals of his party program, which the Liberals are not prepared to renounce in the process of merging with UD. These are formulated in a nine-point document entitled "The KLD's Liberal Minimum." The document discusses the following points: a new constitution, which should be approved by the whole nation; a gradual regionalization of the country; and the preservation of the state's neutral worldview, which should nonetheless guarantee optimum relations between state and church institutions. The last clause could, in my opinion, generate reservations among UD's right-wing orientation because Tadeusz Mazowiecki—and, incidentally, other UD activists, too—would replace the condition of "neutral worldview" with one that speaks of a "friendly separation between state and church."

But let us return to the fundamentals of the KLD program. The Liberals go on to discuss the trade unions, which "should not determine the shape of the budget or other important decisions." They discuss the need to protect taxpayers from the state's fiscal policies—in both their open and hidden form. They insist on protection of the free economy: "It is necessary to safeguard economic freedom against all forms of monopoly, unfair competition, and attempts to control it by the power apparatus." They discuss privatization and reprivatization. They talk about reforms in the budget-funded sector. Finally, they mention the need to bring the country "into the sphere of the self-integrating international community."

So much for the Liberals.

Now for the Democratic Union: The Congress convening on Saturday and Sunday should pass decisions on several questions and also elect a chairman. If Tadeusz Mazowiecki refuses to be persuaded to put up his candidacy, there could well be trouble. Individual Union factions have campaigned to promote their own candidates: Hanna Suchocka, Jan M. Rokita, and Wladyslaw

Frasyniuk. Consequently, observers watching the political scene do not preclude the possibility of an eventual split within the Democratic Union.

KLD's Tusk on Unification With UD

AU1403185394 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 12-13 Mar 94 p 10

[Interview with Donald Tusk, leader of the Liberal-Democratic Congress, by Ewa Milewicz; place and date not given: "Premarital Confessions"]

[Excerpts] [Milewicz] Why did the Democratic Union [UD] win seats in the Sejm and the Liberal-Democratic Congress [KLD] did not?

[Tusk] Probably because UD received more votes. To vote for the KLD, one has to have firm ideological and economic views. UD's electorate consists of all kinds of people.

[Milewicz] UD got into the Sejm because its image is not so distinct as that of the KLD?

[Tusk] Every party in Poland has its own image. We appear as schemers and thieves, Center Accord appears as a collection of iconoclasts and dullards, and the Christian-National Union appears as a party of clericalists.

[Milewicz] And UD? Perhaps it appears as a collection of mummies?

[Tusk] Indeed.

[Milewicz] Perhaps people prefer dull political parties to vociferous ones?

[Tusk] Such a view would be an insult to UD. The KLD is more avant-garde, less embedded in Polish life.

[Milewicz] Less embedded in the life of this Poland.

[Tusk] Yes. The KLD is alien to the life of Poland in 1993 and 1994. Despite everything, UD is more at home.

[Milewicz] So the KLD is merging with UD in order to avoid oblivion?

[Tusk] That is certainly one of the reasons. I fear being pushed out into the fringe. I would like to see a revitalization of the KLD's principles.

[Milewicz] What? You mean you want to experience a parliamentary "afterlife"?

[Tusk] The KLD needs to be revitalized because liberal values are not enshrined in our lives. Thanks to the merger, liberal views will have a greater chance of survival. After all, there is no shortage of liberals in UD.

The second reason for the merger is to make life easier for our electorate. People do not want to be forever faced with the decision of who to vote for, the KLD or UD.

[Milewicz] But there are people who would prefer to have a "pure KLD" and a "pure UD".

[Tusk] But there are more and more people who want a clear political situation—in other words, not more than three or four parties competing in the elections. [passage omitted]

[Milewicz] If it were the KLD that had won seats in the Sejm instead of UD, would you still be in favor of a merger?

[Tusk] I have never thought about that.

[Milewicz] Would you not have told UD: Serves you right?

[Tusk] I probably would have done so. But that is natural. There have been a lot of bitter moments in our mutual relations. A television election broadcast on behalf of UD told the viewers not to vote for small parties like us.

It was not the KLD's idea to merge. The signal came from UD. I wish to dispel the myth that it is only the liberals that stand to gain something from the merger, and that UD will only lose. We should all gain something. I am sure that will be the case.

Right Wing To Publish NOWE PANSTWO

WS1503115894 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 15 Mar 94 p 2

[Article by Marcin Dominik Zdort: "Right Wing Wants To Publish Its Own Paper; In A Few Days, NOWE PANSTWO"]

[Text] Rightist coalitions that have been established in recent months want to publish papers that would represent their policy. In several days, the first issue of NOWE PANSTWO [NEW STATE] will come out; it will be a paper related to the alliance of Jaroslaw Kaczynski and Wieslaw Chrzanowski.

NOWE PANSTWO appeared last year (also during the election campaign); there were 10 issues, with a circulation of 3,000 copies, which were internal leaflets of the Center Alliance [PC] published by the office of PC Vice President Adam Lipinski. Lipinski is also the organizer and editor in chief of the new publication.

The first issue, which will appear in several days, will consist of 16 pages; its format will resemble that of GAZETA WYBORCZA, and it will cost 6,000 zlotys. "We imposed a very strict financial discipline; we prepared this issue along with several people from beginning to end," says Adam Lipinski. The publisher of the paper was supposed to be the "New State" Foundation; however, the court of law refused to register it, and it has been for the time being registered as a noncommercial partnership.

NOWE PANSTWO has, for the time being at least, decided not to use the distribution services of "Ruch." Representatives of the editing team claim that it is too expensive. Lipinski's paper will be distributed by private companies, rightist parties, and Solidarity.

The subtitle of NOWE PANSTWO reads: "To the right of the center." This paper is not directly linked to the bloc of the Christian-National Union, the PC, Movement for the Republic, Peasant Accord, and the Conservative Coalition [KK]. The first issue has been prepared, among others, by the leaders of the Union for Real Politics [UPR] such as Stanislaw Michalkiewicz, Rafal Ziemkiewicz, and Tomasz Gabis; Ludwik Dorn of the PC; Marek Budzisz of the KK, as well as people related to such papers as ARKA, DEBATA, and SPOTKANIA. The main subject of the first—strictly political—issue is a debate on what is the real right wing; however, the paper also wants to inform readers about cultural issues and comment on current events. "It is easiest to obtain political material," admits Adam Lipinski. In the beginning, NOWE PANSTWO will appear irregularly, and after a few months it is supposed to become a weekly. The organizers are for the time being not even dreaming of turning the paper into a daily, even though they do not rule out such a possibility in a more remote future.

Also, the Agreement of 11 November, which consists of the UPR, the Christian-Democratic Party [PChD], the Conservative Party, and the Peasant-Christian Party, would like to start a publication "close" to this alliance. Primarily, politicians of smaller parties are making efforts to achieve that because the UPR already has at its disposal NAJWYSZY CZAS, which is quite an influential paper, coming out twice a week (also as NAJWYSZY CZAS-BIS). PChD leader Pawel Laczkowski recently announced that such a paper will be established; so far, however, this has remained up in the air—it is still not known where the money for financing such an initiative should be taken from.

General Views Polish Army Foreign Engagement

AU1403142994 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish
10 Mar 94 pp 1-2

[Interview with Brigadier-General Stanislaw Wozniak, chief of the Department of Foreign Military Affairs at the Ministry of National Defense, by Stanislaw Lukaszewski; place and date not given: "The Army in International Politics"]

[Text] [Lukaszewski] You accompanied Defense Minister Kolodziejczyk on his visit to France. One of the results of this visit is that our Army is going to take part in joint maneuvers with the French and German Armies. What tasks has the visit imposed on your department?

[Wozniak] At their Paris meeting, the defense ministers of Poland, France, and Germany opened a historic stage in the history of mutual relations between these countries. The growth of military bilateral contacts noted by the ministers provided a basis to develop trilateral

cooperation, including meetings of experts and the holding of joint exercises. In this connection, my department now has the task of preparing reports and analyses that take into account the legislative peculiarities of each country that is taking part in international exercises. The ministers approved in principle the idea of a joint exercise that would be held in France in the fall, with the participation of French, German, and Polish troops. Polish observers would also be present.

[Lukaszewski] In accordance with Polish security policy, defense strategy, and foreign policy, this year's military foreign policy is aimed at making Poland a member of European security structures—i.e., the WEU [Western European Union], the EU [European Union], and NATO. As the man responsible for military foreign policy, what are the guiding principles of this policy?

[Wozniak] The guiding principle is that European security is indivisible, and Poland's efforts in this sphere are aimed at creating an all-European security system that matches the political-military challenges and expectations, as well as the economic capabilities. We are trying to establish good political and military relationships not only with our neighbors, but also with other countries. We are concentrating on problems of multilateral regional and all-European cooperation. We are availing ourselves of existing international structures and organizations in order to attain our objective.

[Lukaszewski] What do you think of the CSCE as the platform of a new European security system?

[Wozniak] The CSCE is a major component of the process of creating new European security structures. Our representatives are taking part in CSCE talks on arms control and on confidence and security-building measures. We are concerned that progress be achieved in this sphere.

Within the CSCE, Poland has already been participating with other countries in achieving stability in the region. Poland is also taking part in extinguishing conflicts and supervising the implementation of conventional arms-control agreements such as the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and the 1992 Vienna document. We hope that the CSCE will lead to a cooperative system of security in Europe.

However, the primary goal of Polish politics is full membership in NATO. But, because this is going to take a long time, Poland in the meantime is taking part in the work of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, which is also a major component of the new European security.

[Lukaszewski] What are the other paths of military cooperation for 1994?

[Wozniak] In our plans of cooperation with foreign defense ministries and European military structures this year, we have put greater emphasis on defense problems and the strengthening of democratic control over the armed forces. We have also suggested an exchange of

experiences in planning and conducting military exercises with the help of computer simulations. We will also examine ways of guaranteeing good interpersonal relationships and human rights inside the Army.

[Lukaszewski] What about relations with our neighbors?

[Wozniak] Agreements have been reached that will cause a revival and an increase of good-neighborly relations. There will be an increased flow of information, broader personal contacts, and measures to increase the mutual trust between border zones. For this purpose, there is going to be cooperation in military training between neighboring military districts, as well as between military units and training establishments on both sides of the border.

[Lukaszewski] Have any details been established in this sphere?

[Wozniak] Yes. We are going to send more of our soldiers to be trained in foreign military academies. There are going to be more exchange visits by officers on active duty and by military lecturers. We are going to send soldiers on language training and further training to the United States, Germany, France, Great Britain, and Canada. We will try to send soldiers on training sessions to Norway and Spain. In the Baltic Sea, we are tightening contacts with the naval and coastal defense forces of Germany and Denmark. We will continue to seek agreements with the defense ministries of non-NATO countries on the basic paths of military cooperation. Further ministerial agreements will be concluded soon.

[Lukaszewski] Can you give any details?

[Wozniak] So far, we have concluded military cooperation agreements with the defense ministries of 126 countries, including all of our neighbors—i.e., Germany, Russia, Belarus, Lithuania, Ukraine, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, as well as Belgium, France, Latvia, Greece, the Netherlands, Hungary, and Romania.

The extent and content of the cooperation varies from one country to another. But, in every single case, there is a desire to be open and to implement European agreements in security, disarmament, and confidence-building measures.

[Lukaszewski] What do you think of the Partnership for Peace?

[Wozniak] Poland has eagerly accepted the U.S. Partnership for Peace initiative, viewing it as the first meaningful step in the process of including the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the West European system of security. For us, Partnership for Peace confirms NATO's commitment to the security of all Europe.

[Lukaszewski] What is the situation with our eastern policy?

[Wozniak] Poland wants to open a new chapter in its eastern policy. This need stems from the changes that are occurring on the territory of the former USSR and from our relations with the Russian Federation. In recent years, major progress has been achieved in establishing equal relations with the new countries on this territory. We consider our activity here as a major contribution to the construction of all-European security.

[Lukaszewski] And what is your opinion of the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction?

[Wozniak] We attach particular importance to the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Poland was the coauthor of the UN General Assembly resolution calling on all member countries to sign the convention to ban chemical weapons as soon as possible, which took place in Paris in January 1993. The convention is a unique international agreement in the sphere of disarmament. It imposes a complete and general ban on the use of chemical weapons and introduces broad verification measures at the same time. We hope this ban will be observed and extended indefinitely.

[Lukaszewski] Right now, peace missions are an important factor in stabilizing the military and political situation on a global and regional scale. But let us discuss Polish involvement in UN peace missions separately because that is also an important and interesting topic.

[Wozniak] The involvement of Polish soldiers in international missions goes back almost 40 years. That provides another reason for you to conduct an interview at the Department of Military Foreign Affairs at the Defense Ministry. I suggest you talk to one of my deputies about the participation of the Polish Armed Forces in international activity in extinguishing conflicts and restoring peace.

Commission Questions Magureanu on SRI Leaks

AU1503150094 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in
Romanian 10 Mar 94 p 3

[Simona Popescu note: "The Romanian Intelligence Service Commission: Virgil Magureanu Appears Before It"]

[Text] During its session yesterday [9 March] the Supervisory Commission of the Activity of the Romanian Intelligence Service [SRI] heard [SRI Director] Virgil Magureanu, who presented the report of the institution that he heads on "certain leaks from within the SRI and accusations against certain persons or groups of persons whose actions might affect the national security."

SRI investigations conducted thus far "indicate that this institution has not been and is not involved in the mass media dissemination of the respective materials" (materials published by the ROMANIA MARE weekly, which contained accusations of espionage for foreign secret services—our editorial note). However, as the report points out, the guilt has been passed onto certain former employees of the counterespionage or foreign intelligence services. In conclusion, the SRI report stresses that "after studying and examining the materials published in ROMANIA MARE, it has been ascertained that certain data sent to legal consumers were the basis of articles published by Corneliu Vadim Tudor [owner and chief editor of ROMANIA MARE weekly]"; consequently, the documents were not appropriated from SRI archives, but were lost en route from one institution to another.

SRI Denies Material Leaked to Press

AU1503125494 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in
Romanian 10 Mar 94 p 3

[Letter from Virgil Magureanu, director of the Romanian Intelligence Service, to Vasile Vacaru, chairman of the Joint Standing Commission of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate for Parliamentary Control Over the Activity of the Romanian Intelligence Service, in Bucharest on 9 March]

[Text] Romania, the Romanian Intelligence Service [SRI], the Director's Cabinet; document No. 019124 of 9 March 1994—Secret; Only copy.

To Mr. Senator Vasile Vacaru, chairman of the Joint Standing Commission of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate for Parliamentary Control Over the Activity of the Romanian Intelligence Service:

Regarding certain leaks of information from within the SRI and the accusations against certain persons or groups of persons whose actions might affect the national security, we state the following:

Regarding the article "The Alarm Bell—The Setting Up and Functioning, Under the Guidance of Some Foreign Secret Services, of an Organized Group Placed in Official Positions," published in the weekly ROMANIA

MARE No.185/1 Jan 1994, as well as in connection with other such materials, we have the following to say:

An examination of the ROMANIA MARE article reveals that it was not based on secret information, which might have come from our institution, but rather on information obtained from a number of real situations, known to the public, such as:

- The persons accused in the article have worked in various former institutions (the Institute of Political Studies, the Center of Military Theory and History, the Institute of World Economy, or the International Law and International Relations Association-ADIRI);
- The official activities carried out by ADIRI and its personnel, which also included links with institutions and individuals abroad, especially from the United States and England;
- Scholarships granted by this institute for specialization courses to two of the accused individuals;
- The statements made by Messrs. Vasile Secares [rector of the Romanian National School of Political and Administrative Studies (SNSPA)] and Ioan Mircea Pascu [secretary of state at the Ministry of National Defense] in their interviews with daily AZI on 6 and 26 February 1990, full passages of which were taken over (with a number of comments and interpretations by the author of that article) by the magazine and actually represent the substance of that article.

However, given the allegations about certain named individuals and institutions belonging to some foreign intelligence services, one can assume that the author of the article has used the favors of certain former cadres of the counterespionage of foreign intelligence services, who, by putting together and interpreting certain data, arguments, and suppositions, have managed to confer an aura of professionalism on that article.

A possible argument in favor of this supposition is the fact that, in the 1990-1992 period, similar accusations against other political figures of those times—Silviu Brucan, Dumitru Mazilu [former top leaders of the post-1989 National Salvation Front Council], and so forth—were published by ROMANIA MARE and the SPIONAJ-CONTRASPIONAJ [ESPIONAGE-COUNTERESPIONAGE] magazine led by former Securitate General Neagu Cozma; the authors of the incriminating articles must have had access to material about individuals with connections abroad, known to have belonged to the Third Directorate of the State Security Department [DSS], who could be found in the files of retired Major General Aurelian Mortoiu and retired Colonel Filip Teodorescu, files that were taken over by Vice Admiral Stefan Dinu, after his appointment to the command of the respective union.

The SRI cannot be accused of consciously keeping silent about the matter raised, as claimed by Mr. Senator Eugen Dijmarescu [of the Democratic Party (National

Salvation Front)] in his letter sent to Romania's Senate, a letter that was presented to us during our appearance before the Joint Standing Control Commission on 9 February 1994.

That the SRI did not take an immediate official stand vis-a-vis the respective press materials can be explained by the fact that it had to conduct certain checks, which took time, until final conclusions could be drawn, which rebutted the allegations in the aforementioned article.

From the checks done so far, it results that the SRI has not been and is not involved in any way in the mass-media dissemination of the respective materials. The SRI itself is the first one interested in blocking any leaks of information.

Regarding the publication by ROMANIA MARE of material about alleged criminal activities by Major General Gheorghe Florica [former general commissioner of the Financial Overseeing Body until 1993], we state the following:

An investigation into the activities of an Arab citizen, known to belong to an extremist-terrorist group operating on Romania's territory, has shown that he had criminal links both with the former chief of the Financial Oversight Body and with other Romanian citizens and foreigners.

In this respect, all proof collected by our service was forwarded to the relevant state institutions authorized to take appropriate steps in this respect and were used by them in resolving their cases.

The study and examination of the material published by ROMANIA MARE reveal that some of the data sent to the legal consumers (various institutions) was at the basis of the articles published by Senator Corneliu Vadim Tudor. (As a matter of fact, our institution will continue its investigation to establish the way in which this data, which was not meant for publication, has been disseminated.

Regarding the letter sent to you by George Sergiu Rizescu, deputy of the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party [PNTCD] from Arges, who asks that one should clarify his alleged collaboration with the former Securitate and the SRI, we state the following:

EVENIMENTUL ZILEI on 11 July 1992 published some material from the archives of the former Arges County Securitate branch regarding certain informer files, which also included the names of certain PNTCD leaders from Arges.

The same issue of the newspaper published the transcript of a recording—registration number 0012806 of 3 March 1992—belonging to the Arges County Intelligence Section, which contains references to Mr. Deputy Sergiu George Rizescu, who, on one occasion, allegedly told his entourage about the PNTCD's position vis-a-vis the parliamentary elections due to be held in 1992.

The results of the investigation carried out by the SRI to elucidate this case were at the basis of legal suit No. 302576 of 20 July 1992 started by the SRI against EVENIMENTUL ZILEI editors Dan Andronic and Ion Cristoiu for disclosure of state secrets as well as against Lieutenant Colonel Emilian Oprescu, active officer at the Arges County Intelligence Section, for negligence shown in keeping state secrets.

The case is being investigated by the military prosecuting magistracies of the General Prosecutor Magistracy of the supreme Court of Justice, under penal file No. 395/P/1992.

As shown by the text of transcript of recording No. 0012806 of 3 June 1992 published in daily EVENIMENTUL ZILEI, Mr. Deputy Rizescu has not been and is no "source of information" for our institution.

On the other hand, the checks we have conducted in the archives of the former Securitate—documents that can be accessed to in accordance with the provisions of Article 45, Paragraph 4 of Law No. 14—show that Mr. Deputy Sergiu George Rizescu has not been part of the Securitate's network of informers.

Constantly concerned with ensuring the protection of the information it holds (a specialized body in charge of this task is actually operating within our institution) and with drastically and promptly punishing any violations in this respect, the SRI emphasizes the urgent need to elaborate a set of rules in order to protect the data and information not intended for publication.

By the same token, the appearance of press material that undoubtedly uses data from the aforementioned category requires investigation at the level of all state institutions where such leaks might occur. The SRI is directly responsible only for its own violations from the rules governing the circulation of data and information that constitute a state secret and are not meant for publication.

Leading Politicians Assess Cabinet Reshuffle

AU1503154194 Bucharest COTIDIANUL in Romanian
11 Mar 94 p 4

[Interviews with politicians by Radio Observator on the 6 March government reshuffle; place and date not given: "A Government Reshuffle, But It Comes to the Same Thing"]

[Text]

Petre Roman, president of the Democratic Party (National Salvation Front) [PD-FSN]: "One Third of the Current Government Has Not Been Validated"

[Radio Observator] What do you think about the government reshuffle?

[Roman] No one can argue a government's right to seek to improve its work, including by cabinet reshuffle. However, the way it was done gives rise to concern and even disappointment.

[Radio Observer] What are you referring to?

[Roman] First, I am referring to the fact that the result of this reshuffle, after the one a few months ago, done in the same manner, is that one third of the current government consists of people who have not been confirmed by Parliament. Reshuffles made by ignoring parliament are to the detriment of democracy and the Constitution. Once again we note that the Constitution is observed only when it is convenient. When it is not convenient, then it can be violated.

This situation causes concern. Second, there is the inevitable question: How does this sudden and inexplicable reshuffle concur with sitting down at the negotiating table with the political forces within the opposition? It shows the mistrust with which efforts are made to achieve a political consensus in order to get out of the economic and social blockage and launch economic recovery.

Here there is both concern and disappointment. And there is a certain disappointment with the removal of Lieutenant General Nicolae Spiroiu, the man who assumed the risk and, at the same time, the very difficult duty to modernize the military defense system of establishing the military hierarchy on the principles of competence and reform, so as to move the Romanian Army as close as possible to NATO structures.

These are the questions raised in connection with this reshuffle.

[Radio Observer] To go back to what you said before, I understand you are disappointed because you are convinced that, while the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania] was conferring with you, the PNTCD [National Peasant Christian Democratic Party] and the PSDR [Social Democratic Party of Romania], the government decided on the reshuffle and thus, the talks with you were, in a way, conducted on a parallel level, this being known to the PDSR.

[Roman] The risk is that these talks, which we view as fundamental and involving great responsibility, namely to get out of our impasse and blockage, now seem like a facade.

[Radio Observer] Do you think that there is any use continuing the dialogue?

[Roman] I think we have an obligation to maintain the idea of a dialogue, but the way it is to take place has to be discussed. In this respect, I first want to consult my party colleagues and maybe also other political forces within the opposition to try to clarify why this happened, which, indeed, may obscure exactly what seems a ray of light in this ever darker period in the Romanian nation's existence.

Ion Solcanu, PDSR senator: "This Is Not a Pro-Forma Reshuffle"

[Radio Observer] The cabinet reshuffle has earned a lot of criticism. Is it justified?

[Solcanu] You see, the presence of the two civilian figures at the helm of the Ministries of Interior and National Defense very well correspond to the recommendations made to Romania and this aspect also is part of the reform. From this angle, I could say that it surely was not a pro-forma reshuffle. To replace four important ministers does not mean a pro-forma reshuffle and the presence of only one minister coming from our party does not mean a consolidation of our party in the government team.

[Radio Observer] Does this government reshuffle, at a time when the PDSR was holding talks with the other political forces, not compromise the negotiations with those forces?

[Solcanu] I do not think the problem can be posed this way and I will tell you why. During our talks with the parties, both with the PD(FSN), Mr. Sergiu Cunesco's PSDR [Social Democratic Party of Romania], and with the PNTCD [National Peasant Christian Democratic Party], we explained that, although discussed as a problem, the objective of parliamentary majority is a question of the more distant future that should not be forced.

[Radio Observer] And a last question: Are the four newly appointed ministers going to be confirmed by parliament?

[Solcanu] Regulations do not provide for this. The government reshuffle is decided by the president on the proposal of the prime minister. The complete government team is confirmed by parliament when the government program is voted on and passed. Thus, this is another reshuffle and it is absolutely constitutional.

Gheorghe Funar, president of the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR]: "We Will Support the Government If the Protocol Is Respected"

[Radio Observer] Ion Diaconescu, vice president of the PNTCD, said at one point that the government reshuffle was done on purpose in order not to anger the allies of the government party. What is your opinion in this respect, Mr. Funar?

[Funar] Since there have only been replacements in four of the ministries where the PUNR also wanted a change of ministers, we hope that, from the point of view of the PUNR, this reshuffle will be much more comprehensive and will include at least three-four other ministries.

[Radio Observer] That is what I wanted to hear because, in fact, this reshuffle does not include the ministries that are involved in the reform process. Does this not disappoint you?

[Funar] We are not talking of disappointment. The discussions held with those who are leading the PDSR prompted the idea that in a future stage—and we hope that it will not be too long—there will be modifications in other ministries too, leading finally to a much more solid government team, including reshuffles at the ministries you referred to, the ones that are much more directly involved in the reform.

[Radio Observer] Well, but does the way things have developed not suggest, by any chance, that a future reshuffle would also be within the PDSR?

[Funar] This is also possible on condition that competent people are found and accept such positions as minister. Maybe some of them will not belong to the PDSR, but will be independent, just as the prime minister is; maybe they will be liked by the PUNR as well.

[Radio Observer] Mr. Funar, some observers believe that the PDSR is trying to strengthen its position as a single party. Under what conditions and how are you going to act toward the PDSR?

[Funar] I think this is a much more theoretical remark. The PDSR will not be able to achieve a higher percentage than that achieved in the elections or greater support, for that matter, except through negotiations with other political formations within the so-called government arc, which has supported the Vacaroiu government so far, or within the opposition.

[Radio Observer] Well, but these negotiations will be broached from a different position, because, as has been proved twice—in August and now—the reshuffle can be performed under one's own steam.

[Funar] This is possible any time but it is not enough for the PDSR. It needs the support of the team, particularly in parliament.

[Radio Observer] And you will continue to grant this support?

[Funar] For the time being, this support will continue, provided the provisions of the protocol concluded with the PDSR are applied.

Romanian President Ion Iliescu: "Before Talking About a New Coalition, We Have To Achieve a Common Platform of Understanding"

[Radio Observer] Do you think that in the future, let's say by fall, it will be possible to form a government, including the opposition?

[Iliescu] This is another question altogether. It requires different steps to achieve a viable platform for a larger and united government team. It would not be bad to achieve such a thing. I have always been frank and have sought this. We have had such a coalition government: the Stolojan government. You may recall that in 1990,

after the first elections, I made such proposals, irrespective of the fact that there was a party holding parliamentary majority. Even at that time I said that it would be useful to create a broad coalition. This idea was rejected at that time. Then the Stolojan coalition government was formed. I can say that it was an interesting and useful political experiment. Such a coalition would be welcome especially today when we do not have a majority party. This, however, requires a better atmosphere and platform. I want to see how the second round of talks is going to conclude. During the first round I held talks with party representatives. Now the second round is being held between parties, that is between the ruling party and the other parties from all political spectrums—both from the left and the right, although this delineation is relative. This time around our talks may yield results. What I mean is that before talking about a government coalition we have to achieve a platform of common understanding that may facilitate such a coalition.

Teodor Mohora, vice president of the Socialist Party of Labor (PSM): "We Are a Party on the Rise"

[Radio Observer] I would like to quote one of your statements: "I believe that, with the current reshuffle, the work of this government cannot change radically. What really needs reshuffling is the way the entire cabinet acts and is involved in solving our economic and social problems."

[Mohora] This comment starts out from an observation that may be different from that of the government and ruling party. We, the PSM leadership, are participating in our party's county conferences and I can say that we have the opportunity—in direct discussions with the people—to realize that the country is experiencing a difficult economic and social situation, which has been generated by the government's inconsistent and incoherent actions.

Thus, we think that, without reconsidering the cabinet program and work style, this government reshuffle will not yield spectacular results, even if, let us say, the people who appointed to government positions are competent people who could make an increased contribution to coordinating the respective fields.

[Radio Observer] From your party's point of view, what direction will the talks take?

[Mohora] During the talks, we said clearly that we wanted to discuss the country's basic problems, and, of course, those of the government. Thus, in view of the PSM's chance of having access to the government, we are interested in the government program. In any case, what we are interested in is to clearly settle the relations we will continue to maintain with the ruling party and government through a political understanding. For, as you well know, since the elections of September 1992 our situation is a paradoxical one—and that applies not only to us, to our party. As a matter of fact, four parties other

than the PDSR support a government, without a clear political understanding, as the provisions of the Constitution actually prove.

[Radio Observer] A last question. There is a lot of talk about early elections, and some people are even stirring up this issue like a sort of scarecrow. What is the PSM's position in this respect?

[Mohora] We think it is not positive to force early elections this year because we are experiencing an extremely difficult economic period. New elections could cost us precious time and a lot of money. Certainly, you might think we are hypocrites to see us fiercely oppose early elections, because, as you know, we are a party on the rise and in the event of elections, if there are early elections, we will win an increased number of mandates.

We are thinking, however, of the situation in our country, that is, of the national interest, which, we believe, does not need early elections.

Ion Diaconescu, vice president of the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party (PNTCD): "The Balance of Political Forces in Romania Has Not Changed at all"

[Radio Observer] Do you believe this was a genuine government reshuffle or just a pro-forma one?

[Diaconescu] It has certainly been a reshuffle, but it was not the reshuffle expected by the public. The public wants a different government; in fact, this is actually the same government, spruced up with two or three technocrats, who, in fact, are also leaning toward the PDSR. Seen in this light, I believe that absolutely nothing has changed in the balance of political forces in our country, something that spares us the effort to think of a reorientation from this point of view. We are faced with the same situation, thus we may continue the same position. What shocked me, however, was the fact that General Spiroiu was replaced at this time when he is involved in a scandal with Senator Corneliu Vadim Tudor [leader of Greater Romania Party]. The fact that he was replaced now makes one believe that President Ilescu was favoring Vadim Tudor given the fact that he was warned of measures against him, but continues to hold his former position, while General Spiroiu was replaced.

[Radio Observer] Why should he not favor General Spiroiu? After all he has been appointed ambassador to NATO in Brussels?

[Diaconescu] I think the position of ambassador to NATO in Brussels is lower than the position of minister of defense. I think that the ambassador in Brussels is subordinated to the Ministry of Defense.

[Radio Observer] Do you think that thus the demand by smaller and allied parties, namely to remove General Spiroiu, was met, a demand that constituted a condition for even participating in the negotiations?!

[Diaconescu] Maybe. The fact that the replaced ministers are, generally speaking, ministers who, of late, gave reasons for lots of discussions, rightly or wrongly, proves that in Spiroiu's case only this aspect was taken into account. The government continues to be a monocolor government and the change has taken place in such a way that former allies, who, of course, will continue to be the allies of the ruling party, are not angered.

[Radio Observer] How do you explain the fact that none of the portfolios whose holders have been replaced are in the economic area; thus the Vacaroiu government's economic line has not changed. If we are talking of change, should we not have expected something else, given the country's economic plight?

[Diaconescu] That is correct. It means that the government thinks that the line it has pursued so far is a positive one, all the government achievements are positive; but I want to ask you: How do you explain the current situation? It constantly wants to make the public believe that this whole economic disaster is a matter of fate, without no responsibility falling on the political leadership in our country, that it has not made any mistakes and can thus continue the same way.

Deputy Prevented From Speaking Hungarian

AU1603105294 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 0500 GMT 16 Mar 94

[Excerpt] On 15 March, Hungary's national day, during the time reserved for the members of the Chamber of Deputies to make personal speeches, Mr. Imre Borbely, UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] deputy, marked that holiday and intended to present the essence of his statement speaking in the Hungarian language. His initiative was received with protests on behalf of the members of the Chamber of Deputies and thus the chairman of the session, Mr. Radu Berceanu, requested that in the Romanian parliament Mr. Borbely should use the language of the state of which he is a citizen. Despite this the UDMR deputy, according to his own statement, still addressed the chamber with a few words of greeting in Hungarian.

In their replies, independent Deputy Petre Turlea and Constantin Ciurtin, a PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party] deputy, protested the idea of celebrating the Hungarians' national day on Romania's soil, considering especially the fact that the UDMR leaders uphold the autonomy of the regions with a majority ethnic Hungarian population, a fact that violates Romania's Constitution.

The information bulletin published by the UDMR press bureau, which we received last night via fax, terms the occurrence in the Chamber of Deputies as a regrettable incident, as the UDMR deputy was prevented from uttering a few words in the Hungarian language. [passage omitted]

Poll Shows PDSR-Opposition Coalition Favored

AU1503175894 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in
Romanian 11 Feb 94 p 3

["Opinion Poll by the Romanian Public Opinion Poll
Institute on the Subject: What Does the Electorate Think
About the Realignments on the Political Scene?"]

[Text] Between 27 February and 3 March, IRSOP
[Romanian Public Opinion Poll Institute] carried out a
public opinion poll by querying a representative cross-
section of the whole country's adult population, exclu-
sively for Romanian Television. The institute inter-
viewed 1,000 people from 62 urban and rural localities.
As usual, the margin of error is plus or minus 3 percent.

Here are the main results:

How, in your opinion, should the political crisis in
parliament be resolved?

52 percent—through negotiations among the parties

48 percent—through new elections

Do you think that a new government should be formed
or that the present government should stay on?

68 percent—a new government should be formed

32 percent—the current government should stay

What kind of government do you prefer?

45 percent—a political government

55 percent—a government of no political coloring (made
up of technocrats)

If the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR] were
to decide to form a government with other political
parties, what parties would you like it to form a govern-
ment with?

60 percent—with the opposition parties

40 percent—with the allied parties

In your opinion, what direction is Romania taking now?

16 percent—toward capitalism

11 percent—toward a kind of Western socialism

13 percent—toward a restoration of communism

60 percent—no clear direction

Do you think that quiet will prevail in Romania in the
next six months or not?

55 percent—there will be quiet

45 percent—there will be no quiet

What is your opinion about the following institutions:

United Nations—76 percent have a good opinion of it;
24 percent a poor opinion

Council of Europe—75 percent good; 25 percent poor

NATO—66 percent good; 34 percent poor

World Bank—57 percent good; 43 percent poor

IMF—53 percent good; 47 percent poor

Cot Introduces Successor, Protests UN Policy*AU1503140594 Paris AFP in English 1346 GMT 15 Mar 94*

[Excerpts] Zagreb, March 15 (AFP)—UN General Jean Cot, speaking to journalists Tuesday [15 March], called for the right for the military to use air strikes in Bosnia without going through current cumbersome administrative procedures. His comments came as Washington and Paris accused the United Nations of lacking the will to use air strikes, after Serb attacks on French UN troops over the weekend.

Cot, the outgoing commander of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in former Yugoslavia said he noted that authority to order "close air support" had passed from the Secretary General, Butrus Butrus-Ghali, to his special envoy in Zagreb Yasushi Akashi. "I am convinced it is necessary to go further, and in some clearly outlined, clearly defined cases authority should be given to the military, which is not irresponsible," the French general said at a press conference to introduce his successor General Bertrand de Lapresle.

Cot has long demanded the right to order airstrikes and his insistence largely prompted his dismissal by Butrus-Ghali in mid-January. De Lapresle, using more guarded language, agreed that "there are cases which justify a very rapid response, not to make war but to guarantee our most important right, that of legitimate self-defence." [passage omitted]

French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe assailed the United Nations on Monday for its slow response, saying, "One must act faster and be more determined." French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur, who visited Bihac on Sunday, strongly criticized "the often overly long delays, (and) the too heavy administrative and political procedures" preventing immediate retaliation when blue helmets come under fire.

Karadzic: Ultimatums No Longer Accepted*LD1503145694 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1237 GMT 15 Mar 94*

[Text] Athens, 15 Mar (TANJUG)—The peace negotiations on Bosnia must return to being under the auspices of the European Union [EU], Radovan Karadzic, president of the Srpska republic, said in an interview to Greek reporters in Pale. Radovan Karadzic said, the progovernment newspaper TA NEA reports, that he would soon visit Athens and suggest to Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou that solutions to the war in Bosnia should be regarded as the EU's priority task. Karadzic will demand of Papandreou that Greece, in its capacity as EU president, should press for restarting the Geneva peace negotiations. As TA NEA stresses, the president of the Srpska republic expressed disappointment with the fact that the United States has taken a lead in resolving the crisis in Bosnia by bypassing the United Nations. Radovan Karadzic said he would like to see a solution for Bosnia taking place within Greece's EU Presidency

mandate. Asked by Greek reporters about his views on the West's continuing habit of stubbornly bringing pressure to bear on the Serbs and threatening them with military action, Karadzic said the Serbs would no longer accept any ultimatums. In Karadzic's words, the recent NATO ultimatum was knocking on an open door as it was a well-known fact that three days before that the Serbs had agreed to demilitarization with the UN secretary general's special envoy, Yasushi Akashi. The Greek reporters asked Karadzic about his opinion of the crisis between Athens and Skopje. The president of the Srpska republic regards Athens' policy towards Skopje as correct. He stressed that The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM] has a future only if it joins the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in some form of confederation—something that would ensure the preservation of its integrity.

Discusses Territorial Concessions*LD1503174994 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1738 GMT 15 Mar 94*

["Pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, Mar 15 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic said on Tuesday that the Serbs were prepared to give up 16 percent of the territory they control in Bosnia. In a statement to REUTERS, Karadzic underscored that Serbs currently control 72 percent of the territory in Bosnia-Herzegovina. "We are ready to give up some Serb territory for peace but certainly not a big amount. I think that we will keep 56 to 57 percent of the territory." Karadzic said he expected the United States, which brokered the Croat-Moslem agreement of a federation, to guarantee that the alliance would not be anti-Serb.

American and Russian peace envoys underscored that the Serbs hold the key to a solution of the Bosnian conflict and Karadzic reiterated that Bosnian Serbs do not intend to boycott negotiations. "We will certainly join the talks," Karadzic said but did not specify when. "We do not reject talks about some loose association or some ties on the space of former Yugoslavia between former and newly-founded Yugoslav republics," Karadzic said.

Izetbegovic Views Federation, Confederation*AU1503160494 Split NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 9 Mar 94 pp 3,4*

[Interview with President of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency Alija Izetbegovic by Zdravka Soldic; place and date not given: "Only People Who Have a Guilty Conscience Resist Confederation"]

[Text] Croatian journalists have not had the chance to interview the President of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency Alija Izetbegovic. President Izetbegovic would always refuse to talk to them. A day after the preliminary

agreement on forming a federation of the areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina with Bosniak-Muslim and Croat majorities was signed, the president of Bosnia-Herzegovina agreed to give an interview to NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA, the Croatian political weekly.

[Soldic] Mr. President, how did you take the signed preliminary agreement on forming a federation in areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina with majority Bosniak and Croat populations?

[Izetbegovic] With mixed feelings of hope and doubt. I do not think I have to explain the reason for my ambiguous feelings. If you have good intentions, you will take the news with hope, if you are also realistic, you will have many reasons for doubt and apprehension. But, for me, it was good news after a long time.

[Soldic] On whose initiative did this agreement come about?

[Izetbegovic] This time, the United States took the initiative and they got strong support from Germany, Turkey, Austria, and some other Western and Muslim countries. But you surely remember that I made a similar proposal sometimes last summer. It was during a dinner-party Lord Owen gave in his Geneva residence for [Croatian President] Tudjman and myself. There were only the three of us there, but my proposal was published in the Croatian press, I think. Mr. Tudjman refused the proposal at the time.

Mr. Tudjman and I Behind the Scenes

[Soldic] Which Bosnian, Croat, and international factors participated in making this proposal?

[Izetbegovic] Our delegations, headed by [Foreign Ministers] Silajdzic and Granic participated directly, and, naturally, Mr. Tudjman and I behind the scenes. I influenced some solutions in the agreement, but my role was more one of insisting on looking for and finding solutions. I do not know exactly what President Tudjman was doing, but I presume he had a similar role. Our job was made easier by the fact that Silajdzic and Granic are very competent and good negotiators, but I still think that, without the active involvement of the United States, we would not have got very far. The fact that Christopher, Gore, Redman, and even President Clinton himself were actively involved in this says a lot.

[Soldic] This agreement foresees an organization on a cantonal basis, i.e., the idea of creating ethnic ministates was completely abandoned. Will cantons have national characteristics and how many cantons will there be in the federation in the Bosnia-Herzegovina areas with Bosniak and Croat majorities?

[Izetbegovic] We could say that the concept of ethnic ministates was thereby relinquished. However, cantons will mostly be national. I could say national, but not ethnically pure. Regard this, the area of central Bosnia is a specific case, because the population is mixed, or better

yet, turned upside down, as if there had been a demographic earthquake. I have already mentioned the initiative I presented last summer on a joint state of the Muslims and the Croats. I was specifically motivated at that time by central Bosnia, i.e., the insolubility of that area. I felt that we would continue to fight hopelessly for this area because we instead on dividing it, and this is where I was, unfortunately, right. And regarding the number of the cantons, we still do not know yet, but I believe there will be between seven and nine cantons.

[Soldic] How much territory will the future cantons take?

[Izetbegovic] One of the introductory provisions of the preliminary agreement gives an answer to this question, in a very general manner, and says that the federation is formed in areas with Muslim and Croat majorities. I think that would be about 60 percent of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Soldic] How do they intend to solve the problem of the areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina controlled by Karadzic's Serbs?

[Izetbegovic] In short: The agreement is also open to the Serbs. If they do not want to accept that, they can opt for the union option from the Geneva concept. What I am trying to say is that they can choose from several variants, provided that Bosnia-Herzegovina remains an integral country or, to be more precise, provided that the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina do not change.

[Soldic] Can you explain the division of responsibility between central and cantonal authorities?

[Izetbegovic] I recommend that your readers read the relevant provisions of the preliminary agreement. They are very clear and need no additional explanation. We can say that the proposed solution is characterized by a relatively strong central authority, with the wide competence of cantons, especially regarding questions of specific national interest. We could generally say: The state provides joint interests and cantons protect national interests.

Solutions Specific Like Bosnia

[Soldic] What is the planned national structure in the central and cantonal authorities?

[Izetbegovic] Those are various combinations of the principle of parity and the principle of proportion. Parity is planned for the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, as it is a very important body, and in the House of Nations. The proportion principle will be applied in the Chamber of Representatives and "something in between" in the federal government (at least 30 percent of ministerial seats are reserved for Croat deputies), while, in the cantons, all organs are established on a proportional basis.

[Soldic] When will the constitution of the federation be adopted?

[Izetbegovic] The draft constitution is being established in Vienna. After the agreement is signed, it is planned that it will be ratified by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly. Therefore, we are planning a legal way of transforming the state from the present constitutional system to a new one.

[Soldic] Does the present agreement foresee the presidential system?

[Izetbegovic] Yes, to some extent. However, that will not be a purely presidential system. I would rather call it a combination of presidential and parliamentary systems. On the other hand, the majority principle, or the rule of the majority, which always characterizes a parliamentary system of authority, has been significantly amended or limited by a two-chamber composition of the future assembly, where the second chamber, the House of Nations, requires consensus, and so forth. All in all, a specific solution, as specific as Bosnia itself.

[Soldic] Does the present agreement abolish the previously signed agreement on the EC administration of Mostar?

[Izetbegovic] No, during the last hours of the talks, just before the agreement was signed, we agreed that the European Union would temporarily be in charge of Mostar.

[Soldic] Do the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Croats, lose the right to dual citizenship acquired a year and a half ago as a result of this agreement?

[Izetbegovic] No, they do not.

[Soldic] What do you think about the preliminary agreement on the principles and basis for founding a confederation between the Republic of Croatia and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Izetbegovic] I support that project. As you know, the idea was developed much earlier than the Washington agreement.

[Soldic] You have probably heard that a part of the Croatian public resists that idea, as well as the idea about a joint state with the Muslims.

[Izetbegovic] I know, I have heard that. Resistance comes from those who have a guilty conscience and are deeply involved in this senseless conflict between the Croats and the Muslims. They fear the truth will come to the surface once the war is over. Naturally, there are those who are not well-informed—or who are misinformed. Let me give them some information: More than 10,000 Muslims actively participated in the Croatian Army in the war of 1991. Many have never returned to their homes, and I personally prevented 25,000 to 30,000 of our men joining the "JNA" [Yugoslav National Army] to go to the Croatian front during the war. It was in August, 1991, when our Presidency—although Serbian deputies were opposed to it and in spite of the protests, and even threats, of the former JNA—

forbade any further mobilization of young Bosnian men to the JNA. One should not forget those things, although it seems to me that some of your people have a Freudian loss of memory. Anyway, I know the views of most Croatian intellectuals on this question, the way the Catholic Church thinks, and even the views of relevant political factors, those in the authorities and those from the opposition. I am well-informed and pleased about that.

[Soldic] Does Croatia get the right of transit through Neum, the territory of the federation?

[Izetbegovic] Yes, it does, without restrictions, as if there were no borders. That is reciprocal: Bosnia gains similar rights on the communication line from Ploce to the Bosnian border. This is, of course, of the greatest practical value for the future confederal relations between the two states.

"I First Thought About Roads..."

[Soldic] What can refugees expect from this normalization of relations between the Croats and the Muslims, i.e., between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Izetbegovic] I mentioned one of our motives for this arrangement. That is the problem of central Bosnia. The second, more important, one—perhaps the most important one—concerns refugees. Conflicts between us and the Croats have completely marred the prospects for their return. All roads were closed. There seemed to be no way out. You asked me—I think that was your first question—how did I take those signatures in Washington. Let me tell you what I thought first when I heard the news about the signing of those documents. I thought about the roads that would be opened and the thousands of our people who would use them to run to their homes. You do not know how much they desire that. I know, I was with them, I saw it. Thank God for this sudden glimmer of hope.

Sarajevo Corridors To Open; Maglaj Under Seige

AU1603100594 Paris AFP in English 0955 GMT 16 Mar 94

[Excerpt] Sarajevo, March 16 (AFP)—The Moslem-led Bosnian Government and Bosnian Serbs were to initial an agreement at Sarajevo airport on Wednesday [16 March] for the opening of roads around the Bosnian capital. Three corridors have been chosen which, once open, will have the effect of partially lifting the Serb siege of Sarajevo. One will pass through the Serb-held industrial suburb of Vogosca to reach central Bosnia via the Moslem town of Visoko, 25 kilometres (15 miles) from here. The other two routes will link the Serb suburbs of Ilizda and Lukavica and the Bosnian suburbs of Butmir and Dobrinja, passing through the airport which is in the hands of the UN Protection Force. Once initialled, the agreement is due to take effect from Saturday, for civilian and commercial traffic. UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] will have to be given 24-hour notice of

transport of merchandise, which it will communicate to the two sides, and the entry and exit points will be under UN guard.

In other areas, Bosnian Serb troops continued to defy a United Nations Security Council demand Monday to lift their nine-month siege of the northern Moslem enclave of Maglaj to allow access for humanitarian convoys. Aid has been unable to reach Maglaj by road since October. The besieged communities have since then been forced to rely on air drops. [passage omitted]

Serbs Postpone Corridor Negotiations

AU1603121794 Paris AFP in English 1206 GMT 16 Mar 94

[Excerpt] Sarajevo, March 16 (AFP)—The formal adoption of an accord to reopen roads around the Bosnian capital was postponed for a day Wednesday at the request of Bosnian Serb officials, the commander of UN forces in Bosnia said.

General Michael Rose said the Serbs requested the delay, the second in three days, so that experts could be brought in from Belgrade. [passage omitted]

UNHCR Protests Serb Blockade of Aid Convoys

AU1503145694 Paris AFP in English 1437 GMT 15 Mar 94

[Text] Sarajevo, March 15 (AFP)—The office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) denounced Tuesday [15 March] the Bosnian Serbs' continued refusal to allow humanitarian aid convoys from reaching the besieged Bosnian town of Maglaj. UNHCR spokesman Peter Kessler said his agency's repeated requests to the Serbs to allow humanitarian convoys into the north Bosnian town have so far fallen on deaf ears. No relief convoys have managed to get into the enclave, which shelters about 100,000 people, since October 26, when two UNHCR Danish drivers were killed. Since then the UN has carried out food air-drops over the region, some of which have missed their target, Kessler said.

Radio Sarajevo reported Monday that Serb troops had fired upon a group of people trying to retrieve some of the food but the UN, which helicoptered 10 British liaison officers into the enclave Sunday, was unable to confirm the report. The radio also reported that the Serbs had shelled the town on Tuesday.

Meanwhile a UNHCR aid convoy was waiting in the central town of Zenica for the Serbs to give it the green light to head to Maglaj, some 80 kilometers north (50 miles). The convoy of about 10 trucks is being escorted by British peacekeeping troops.

Kessler said although Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic has given his approval for the passage of the convoy, local Serb authorities say they have received no word from their superiors.

The Maglaj region has become one of the hottest spots in Bosnia in recent weeks as the Serbs intensified their stranglehold on the enclave, formerly linked to territory held by the mainly Moslem Bosnian army and Croat troops. Bosnian military leader Hasim Sedic said the situation in the region escalated last June when the Bosnian army and Croat defense forces (HVO)—allies until then—began fighting. The Croats subsequently formed an alliance with the Serbs in order to isolate the Moslems.

Sadic added that since the March 1 Moslem-Croat accord to form a federation, the HVO has adopted a "passive" attitude concerning the fighting in the Maglaj region. He said the Serbs have some 80,000 troops deployed around the enclave and have helicopters and heavy artillery at their disposal. This could not be independently confirmed.

UN Refusal To Make Maglaj Safe Area Praised

LD1503164194 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1603 GMT 15 Mar 94

[Text] Sarajevo, 15 Mar (TANJUG)—Major General Milan Gvero, deputy chief of staff of the Srpska republic army, today told SRNA that raving Muslim propaganda was only creating false hopes that something could be achieved militarily in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, since the world had at long last understood that it had been fed with lies. Commenting on the refusal by the UN Security Council last night to declare Maglaj "a protected zone" and Butrus-Ghali's explanation that "the Muslims in Bosnia abuse the UN-protected zones," Gvero said the international community had finally decided to examine the actual situation on the ground in Bosnia-Herzegovina realistically. "Experience so far has shown that each time the Muslim forces find themselves in a militarily hopeless situation some international circles get involved and turn the situation to their advantage," Gvero said.

Describing the UN concept of protected zones as "completely wrong," Gvero recalled that, according to international law, a protected zone was a demilitarized territory where "soldiers protect unarmed people, and not a combat formation which, by abusing the UN protection, turns protected zones into combat hotbeds where all means are used to threaten the Serb state."

Ogata Fears Fate of Civilians

AU1503215094 Paris AFP in English 2134 GMT 15 Mar 94

[Text] Zagreb, March 15 (AFP)—Sadako Ogata, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), expressed grave concern Tuesday over the fate of 100,000 civilians in the besieged Bosnian enclave of Maglaj. Following talks here with Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic, Ogata said the situation in the northern Moslem enclave, which has been under siege from Bosnian Serb forces for nine months, was "of great concern to us."

Bosnian Serb troops continued Tuesday to defy a United Nations Security Council demand issued a day earlier to lift the siege immediately to allow access for humanitarian convoys. Aid has been unable to reach Maglaj by road since October. The besieged communities have since then been forced to rely on air drops. Ogata said Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, whom she asked Tuesday to "exert his influence" over the besieging forces, had promised to look into ways of resolving the impasse. "I'm doing my very best to get access to this pocket. This is a very important urgent measure to take," for the 100,000 civilians deprived of necessary aid inside the enclave, she added. The Bosnian Serbs' continued intransigence was "really against the promise that the three parties, including very much the Serbs, have given me on November 18th." On that date the warring parties pledged to halt fighting in and around the Maglaj pocket to allow aid convoys access. Ogata stressed that the humanitarian situation in other parts of Bosnia had "improved enormously." "I do have to give recognition to all the parties in that sense," she added. "Conditions on the ground in Bosnia-Herzegovina are improving a great deal, and we are able to deliver (aid) much, much more easily all over the country."

Ogata is due to travel to Sarajevo Wednesday morning for talks with Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic and Bosnia's UN Protection Force commander, General Sir Michael Rose. Wednesday afternoon she is hoping to visit both Croat and Moslem sectors of the southern Herzegovina city of Mostar.

Ogata is due back in Geneva late Thursday after inspecting a sector of northern Croatia placed under UN protection.

Silajdzic Discusses Russian Presence in Bosnia

LD1603100794 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0700 GMT 16 Mar 94

[Text] In an interview for the Austrian TV station ORT2 following yet another round of Vienna negotiations, Bosnian Prime Minister Dr. Haris Silajdzic said: I am glad that the Bosnian-Croatian talks took place in Vienna. The Austrian Government has invested a great deal of energy and effort to ensure that peace is reached. We genuinely hope for peace rather than war. We hope that human rights, mentioned in the draft constitution, will become reality: the right to life, to freedom, to free movement, to differing views.

Asked to comment on the deployment in Bosnia-Herzegovina of Russian troops as part of the UN contingent, Dr. Silajdzic said: I was in Moscow three days ago. I was open about my concern at the way the Russians have become involved. Several weeks ago Zhirinovskiy visited the aggressor's territories and made nationalistically charged speeches. Soon afterwards Russian troops arrived in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Bosnian Government was not consulted. The Russian troops have been deployed at locations in Sarajevo as well. We fear that Sarajevo will be divided. We fear a new war

there. We shall do our utmost to ensure that a new Berlin wall is not erected there. We are, nevertheless, concerned.

Asked how stable the foundations of the new Bosnian-Croatian trust are and if they could be undermined again in view of the fact that until recently the two people have been engaged in a bloody war, Silajdzic said: Everything is possible. The crucial point is that a stable cease-fire, especially in Sarajevo and Mostar, has come about as a direct result of the current rounds of negotiations. This gives us encouragement and strength to persevere. We hope for the best, Prime Minister Silajdzic said among other things.

Serbs Attack Maglaj, Bihac, Bugojno

AU1603103094

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 0900 GMT on 16 March carries in its regular 10-minute newscast several reports on the fighting in the republic.

Reporting on the situation in Maglaj, Hajrudin Sermic says that "the town underwent the heaviest shelling last night between 2000 and 2100, when one person was killed and four were wounded. The unequal war that [Serb military leader Ratko] Mladic's gunners are waging against the Maglaj people is continuing in the face of international indifference."

Mirza Sadikovic reports from Bihac that "last night after 1930 the Serb aggressor intensified his artillery and tank attacks on the [word indistinct] and Bihac regions. They also attacked the other parts in the operational zone of the Bosnia-Herzegovina [B-H] Army 5th Corps and the Bihac HVO [Croatian Defense Council]. One woman carrying a child was killed in Bosanska Otoka, and several other people were wounded. Over the last 24 hours, the chetniks have been targeting the defensive positions in Grabez and the Grmusko-Srbljanski Plateau with howitzers from Gorija." He says that "the chetniks are again bringing in new forces as they cannot reconcile themselves to their inability to capture the railroad and the road alongside the Una River in order to connect their two fictitious parastates."

In his report from Bugojno, Emir Avdakovic says that "after several days of relative quiet, early this morning the chetniks from their positions in Koprivnica again started firing tank and howitzer shells at the town. The general alarm was sounded and the Bugojno people are now in their shelters."

Hamiz Deronjic reports from Brcko that "our positions were last night targeted by howitzers, tanks, and mortars. A chetnik 122-mm howitzer from the direction of (Tresnjica) was firing at the central sector of the Brcko defense. From Sumari an enemy tank was firing at Jasici and Boderiste." He says that this morning there is "heavy sniper fire at the defense lines."

The B-H Army 3d Corps Press Center says that "even though they have occasionally violated the cease-fire with some small arms fire, the HVO has shown over the last few days that they do want peace in this region. The same cannot be said for Karadzic's chetniks, since they have been preparing for attacks on almost all the fronts held by the 3d Corps. To judge by the intensive movement behind their front lines, the chetniks are not giving up on Zavidovici and the southern corridor. Apart from significant movement of their motorized vehicles and military hardware, they have been keeping up their provocative artillery and small arms fire." The reports says that "yesterday extremists from the HVO violated the cease-fire several times with 12.7-mm sniper rifles in the region of Bistrica. Even though it was quiet in the Lasva Valley, two nights ago a [HVO] unit of 40 to 50 soldiers moved the front line a little by entrenching in (Busovacke Staje), thus violating the cease-fire agreement."

Civilian Areas Shelled

AU1603104794

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 1000 GMT on 16 March carries in its regular 5-minute newscast three further reports on the fighting in the republic.

Updating the situation in Bugojno, Atif Agic says that "the chetniks from Donji Vakuf and Kupres have been shelling the town fiercely since this morning. The army

groups from Operative Group West have been resisting all these attacks, and they even launched counterattacks on some parts of the front. As of today it is units of the Bosnia-Herzegovina [B-H] Army that are in control of Mala Suljaga, where they have also seized one T-55 tank. These good fighters of the B-H Army have inflicted heavy losses on the chetniks in terms of manpower. In retaliation for this morning's defeats, the chetniks have turned their guns on the residential parts of Bugojno. The general alarm has already been sounded several times but the chetnik shells were faster with the result that one civilian has been killed and six wounded so far." As for Gornji Vakuf, he says "the cease-fire between the B-H Army and the HVO is holding surprisingly well."

Enes Ratusic reports from the B-H Army 4th Corps that "there have been no serious military activities to violate the cease-fire between the B-H Army and the HVO in the 4th Corps' theater of operations. However, provocations by some extreme HVO individuals and groups have not entirely ceased." He says that "there has been some heavier fire in the northern sector, particularly in the area of (Bijelimici), where the chetniks used tanks against the defensive positions of the B-H Army and civilian targets in the surrounding villages."

In his report from the Zvornik front, Nijaz Banjanovic says that "the chetnik artillery fell silent yesterday evening, so last night and this morning have been marked only by the usual small arms fire directed at the defense lines of the 206th Chivalrous Brigade."

Redman, Galbraith View Croat-Bosniak Accord*LD1503220494 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 15 Mar 94*

[Text] The Washington accord and the course of the Vienna talks give us every reason to believe that the senseless war between the Croats and the Bosniaks is finally over; whatever ensues, the fact remains that this accord has saved lives. This was underlined by U.S. Ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith at a news conference in Zagreb. He also dwelt on how the agreement is reflected in the situation in the field in Bosnia-Herzegovina and spoke on other points of interest.

The accord opens doors to a more comprehensive agreement between the Croats and the Bosniaks, which is being discussed in Vienna, and to an overall, peaceful solution, he assessed. On the basis of NATO's ultimatum and the Washington accord, and in collaboration with the European Union, we are determined to give the people of this region a peaceful, prosperous, and democratic future, Galbraith stressed.

President Clinton's Special Envoy Charles Redman said that work on further rapprochement between the Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks lies ahead, as well as work on the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bosnia. He pointed to the significant changes in the field in Bosnia compared to the situation three or four weeks ago. He said these changes encourage hope for great possibilities for reaching a solution. An important step to be taken is to include the Bosnian Serbs, because a comprehensive agreement cannot be reached without their participation, Redman said. He stressed that his visit to Belgrade yesterday, when he met Milosevic and Bosnian Serb officials, was a preliminary step. I explained what we have accomplished so far and what we hope to accomplish, he added.

Assessing as productive and constructive yesterday's meetings with President Tudjman, Minister Granic, and other Croatian Government officials, ambassadors Galbraith and Redman underlined their positive and constructive role.

Asked about guarantees for the integration of the UN-protected areas, Redman said he believed this process is creating conditions for a stable situation in the region, not only for peace in Bosnia, and providing better ways for resolving the remaining issues—including the UN-protected zones in Croatia.

Status of Refugees From Bosnia Viewed*AU1503180594 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 11 Mar 94 p 5*

[Article by "I.B.": "Refugees Returning Home Soon?"]

[Text] Zagreb—Since the beginning of the war, 680,000 citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina have been forced to leave their homes. Refugees were given shelter by as many as 111 countries and the largest refugee groups of 10,000

people are accommodated in Germany, Turkey, France, and Austria. Arif Smajkic, minister of refugees, labor, and social welfare in the Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, presented the data at the press conference held yesterday at the Embassy of Bosnia-Herzegovina. "The figure of 680,000 refugees does not include refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina accommodated in Croatia. Exact information about the number of Bosnia-Herzegovinan citizens that are still in Croatia has not yet been gathered. About 70 percent of the total number of refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina are Muslims, there are less Croats, and a large number of Serbs found shelter in refugee camps in Western countries," said Smajkic.

Before coming to Zagreb, where he will talk to Minister Ivan Parac and Adalbert Rebic, Minister Smajkic visited many Western European countries and learnt about the status of refugees and workers staying in those countries. "The accommodation, status, and care of refugees in host countries is satisfactory," said Smajkic. Furthermore, he said that he met with representatives of international humanitarian organizations in Geneva and that they presented many programs for the return of refugees. Before the end of April, the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina will propose several models for the return of refugees, and it can be expected that Bosnia-Herzegovinan citizens will soon start returning to their homes.

Smajkic said that most refugees accommodated in Western countries have welcomed the Croat-Muslim Washington agreement. People will most probably first be able to go back to Herzegovina and central Bosnia, and their return will be financed by their host countries, international humanitarian organizations, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and various funds. Wounded people, medical workers, engineers, and technicians, i.e., professional people important for the rebuilding of the country, will go back first. Large groups of refugees will go back only after accommodation and jobs have been secured for them.

Yesterday, Minister Smajkic visited the "Kruze" refugee center in Zagreb in which, as he said, living conditions, especially hygiene conditions, are satisfactory.

Commentary Compares Tudjman to Tito*AU1503193994 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 8 Mar 94 p 10*

[Commentary by Darko Plevnik: "Tudjman and Tito"]

[Text] At the recent meeting of the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] "Main Lodge," [Croatian President] Tudjman demonstrated enthusiasm about the enormous acceleration of historic events and said that, for him, it had seemed like several decades, rather than just four years. Since he did not specify the direction of those decades that were passing so quickly, judging by the war and the decline of the standard of living, Croatia went 40 years back, rather than forward. The debate about

whether Croatia went back to 1941 or to 1945 has been going on for four years. According to sporadic neostashi folklore study and the study of ornaments, some tend to claim that Tudjman is closer to Pavelic [Croatian politician, founder of the Independent State of Croatia—NDH—in 1941] and the NDH than to Tito and the Socialist Republic of Croatia. One could find many similes to substantiate this topic—formally. However, in order to make a convincing material analysis, one should better consider a meaningful comparison of the way of production of the postwar Tito's society and (post)war Tudjman's society. With regard to that, one could consider the category of a law-ordered state. Legally speaking, the NDH was more of a law-ordered state than the Croatia of the present day. How come? It had monstrous, disgusting, racist laws, but its legal proceedings were more or less governed in accordance with them. Tudjman's Republic of Croatia does not have a legal basis for harassing the Serbs, but rather "the best Constitution in the world for ethnic communities and national minorities," but it does not go by it in most cases.

Constitution and Rights

Such an approach to legislature and regulations was the most distinguishable trait of communists countries. Just as communists made laws to comply with international political good manners, so did Glavas [head of Osijek county], at one point, with regard to defining the national and human rights of the Serbs, say the Croatian Constitution was just a "piece of paper." In distinction to the ustasas, to whom Hitler gave the "revolution" of indulging themselves with the citizens of Croatia, the members of the HDZ won the right to overthrow the state themselves. If the communist revolution carried out in the defensive antifascist war ended by harassing the former enemy, the NDH, the HDZ revolution was also realized in the defensive patriotic war by stigmatizing the participants of former inimical Yugoslavia. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia organized the uprising against the occupying German army [in World War II], and the HDZ did so against the occupying JNA [Yugoslav Peoples Army], and thus, after the victories, the communists remained the only official antifascists and the HDZ members the only official volunteers.

Just as Tito asked that chetniks who did not commit "too many" crimes join the partisans, Tudjman asked them to join the Croatian Army. Tito was teaching that agitation and propaganda was the best means of forcing people to suffer their own damage; Tudjman does that by increasing the propaganda for Croatian national awareness. In diplomatic sequestration, Tito kept Trieste and parts of Istria, Tudjman got "krajina." In the postwar years, the USSR played a role of the magic guarantee for a better future for communists, and now HDZ members think the United States plays a comparable role. The cults of both Tito and Tudjman were created by means of the monopolized media and claque. But, just as legal development of Tito's cult deviated from norms of realist socialism and contributed to the imposition of

sanctions by socialist countries (the Cominform resolution), the development of Tudjman's cult resulted in deviations from European norms, which almost lead to the imposition of sanctions (UN resolutions).

Both regimes rely upon a powerful party—the state in the context of the geopolitically maximum possible political pluralism. At that time, being expelled from the Communist Party of Yugoslavia resulted in an immediate loss of official function; today the same is happening to people expelled from the HDZ. The division of people is executed according to similar propagandistic patterns. People are either for Tito's Yugoslavia or they are traitors who advocate Croatia, i.e., those who want Tudjman's Croatia and traitors who are also inclined toward Istria, Dalmatia, Slavonia.... Both authorities awarded memorial medals and ideologized, politicized, and ascribed state success to their party. What once meant the loss of political, civic rights is today the loss of certificates of citizenship and the pertaining rights. After the communist antifascist war there was class differentiation, and during the HDZ antifascist war ethnic differentiation pays the tribute. One is particularly beware of "internal enemies" who are likely to conspire with the "external enemy"—a constant danger for the young state.

Watching for the Enemy

Therefore, protecting its existence justifies all means, so Tudjman's enforcement of taxes is a counterpart to Tito's enforcement of purchases, and Tudjman's (in)humane moving people from their land is a counterpart to Tito's colonization of other people's property. One-time forceful collectivization is, today, replaced with forceful privatization, and the politics of doing away with kulaks, with the politics of expropriating workers. Farmers and the middle class paid for the development of the "Yugoslav working class," workers and the middle class have paid for the development of the "Croatian class." The former regime forced the mobilization of the work force, and now the work force is being mobilized. Farmers made the biggest contribution to the communist revolution and, in the HDZ revolution, the greatest victims are proletarians—owners of their joblessness.

Centralization is a characteristic of both ways of ruling. However, already in 1945, the communists passed the law on the final liquidation of farmers' debts, which was the death of farmers in the old Yugoslavia. In addition to centralization, HDZ members incurred debts for the population: They took foreign currency from the rich and asked the poor to buy their own apartments (which they acquired on the basis of the public ownership in which they partook financially), their own firms, and to reduce health and retirement benefits. And just as in the communist regime, farmers only had the right to minimal ownership (their own land), it was not used optimally without realistic market conditions; today, maximum private entrepreneurship without market freedom

is equally ridiculous, since it is for the most part mediated by the state, instead of the market Privatization Fund, and has connections with the HDZ discretionary power.

"Kulaks" and "Commies"

If it was once easy to change from sandals to shoes, today one can change from shoes to a BMW even faster. But those who lose awareness from the Croatianist patriotic conscience are not getting BMW's, just as those who lost awareness from the communist shock-worker awareness got very little. "Unaware peasants" used to suffer a lot under the pressure of state tutors if they contributed too little to the state; today, "unaware intellectuals" suffer the same kind of pressure, for they are not creating enough contributions for the statesman. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia "became famous" for its pressure on kulaks to "voluntarily" join peasants' work communities, and the HDZ for its pressure on "social managers" and speculators to join the HDZ, threatening that if they refuse they would either be replaced or have to pay higher taxes. Local communist authorities used to let off steam politically abusing work mobilization, while the aphrodisiac of the HDZ authorities is the abuse of military mobilization. Even greater pleasure is derived from "unknown men" mistreating "NDH kulaks" who refuse to obey work mobilization, i.e., "Yugo-commies" who refuse to wear the uniform of the Croatian Army.

The leadership of the HDZ is aware of all those irregularities, just as the Politburo of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was. Tito also knew what Tudjman knows today. And what does Tudjman know about Tito today? He knows that Tito is a much greater geopolitical and international reference for him than Pavelic. Having

finally paid off the Pavelic-like ideological mortgage, in his conversation with Albanian President Berisha, he made a wise reference to Tito, as a Croatian politician and statesman. Has Tudjman finally surpassed his revolutionary Titoist stage and approached a much more civilized Tito from 1974? Anyway, in interethnic and international relations, Tudjman should also follow Tito's "non-Mandarin" strategic experience. If Tudjman has a strong reason to draw his geopolitical thoughts from the positive and acclaimed achievements of Titoism, he also has reason to democratically dignify it by spreading his tolerance to his critics. One could not publish a similar (ana)logical text in the postwar Tito regime, but the mere act of writing alone could incur an invitation for a "tourist tour" from Goli Otok [island in the Adriatic Sea turned into a prison, mainly for political prisoners] to Lepoglava [prison for political prisoners]. One can say what one thinks about Tudjman—even when one does not think—without fear. Without fear of being imprisoned. Indeed, ambitious people only fear stagnation in their careers. Is a new Tito the "Tudjman" who democratically came to his senses and accepted the pluralistic public, or is Tudjman the old "Tito" who ended his crypto-Croatian strategy on the basis of the verified intraparty rough treatment of his followers?

All this needs to be critically examined in great detail. The criticism of the Croatian state could, therefore, also consist of its development, instead of the denial of both the state and the criticism. The worst critical state is better than the best state criticism, so the state and its critics should agree that statesmen deal in politics and critics in criticism, to the market satisfaction of their clients. What kind of political market is it where politicians always "take care" of critics?

Defense Minister Discusses U.S. Troops, Rumors

AU1603092794 Vienna ORF Television Network in German 2100 GMT 16 Mar 94

[Report by Veronika Seyr from Skopje]

[Text] The disputed Alexander flag defies the stiff Balkan winds—Krivulak, the largest firing range of the former Yugoslav People's Army [JNA], is now deserted and waiting for new occupants. Krivulak is located in the strategically most important location in the Balkans, at the bottleneck of the Vardar Valley. With 10,000 recruits, without any heavy weapons, and without a defense budget, the young state of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] can put the valley to less use than the farmers who live in the vicinity. During maneuvers up to 5,000 JNA soldiers used to camp here.

[Begin recording of Major Stanko Sokolovski of the FYROM Army] Here in Krivulak the Yugoslav—excuse me, Macedonian—infantry gets its final polish. [end recording]

The major still has problems with the new conditions.

[Begin Sokolovski recording] About a month ago a unit of the U.S. UN battalion held firing exercises here. [end recording]

This might become a permanent state of affairs, because there are constant media reports that Krivulak might become the base for 3,000 to 5,000 Americans. For the time being the U.S. UNPROFOR contingent will be increased by 400 to 700 men. The United States seems to want to make Macedonia a calm pole of the Balkans with its presence.

After Albania, should Macedonia, which is located at the crossroads of interests in this region, also be firmly taken into U.S. hands?

The defense minister in Skopje naturally denies this.

[Begin recording Defense Minister Vlado Popovski] This idea of stationing 4,000, 5,000, or 7,000 Americans in Krivulak exists only in the press. It was launched by the Greeks. Serbian newspapers took it over, then it was taken over by Bulgarian papers, or the other way round. However, it is clear: Macedonia is located in an unstable region. The war in Bosnia is not over, and there is the risk that it might spread. Kosovo, too, worries us very much. We are threatened by all military activities. [end recording]

The Swedish UN soldiers have the longest experience with this kind of coexistence. They have been sharing a barracks in Kumanovo with the Macedonian Army for two years now.

Bulgarian Party's Calls for Autonomy Noted

AU1103185894 Skopje MILS-NEWS in English 11 Mar 94

[Unattributed report: "Autonomy for Pirin Macedonia"]

[Text] The leader of the Macedonian organization OMO Ilinden in Bulgaria Jordan Kostadinov stated during the press conference for the agency BALKAN his organization's demand for a status of an autonomous region of Pirin Macedonia. He claims Bulgaria is forcibly assimilating the Macedonians by not acknowledging their language and by physical and moral violence by the authorities, which is a kind of a genocide. He added claims that Macedonians are in fact Bulgarians is a war propaganda, since 75 percent of the population in Pirin Macedonia have a sense of belonging to the Macedonian nation.

Kostadinov demanded introducing the Macedonian language in the schools and Macedonian nation as a category in the passport and diplomas. In addition, he insists on separation of the Nevrokop diocese of a metropolitan from the Bulgarian Church and appointing a Macedonian metropolitan. He also demands the Macedonian autonomous region to have a crowned lion in its symbol and a sun on its flag.

Federal**Kontic Seeking Extension of UN Mandate in RSK***LD1503192794 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1804
GMT 15 Mar 94*

[Text] Belgrade, March 15 (TANJUG)—The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Prime Minister, Radoje Kontic, has called for the extension of the mandate of the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the U.N. protected areas (UNPAs) (Krajina), which expires on March 31, 1994, and set out that the "UNPROFOR presence in the UNPAs is necessary until a political settlement is reached."

The Republic of Serb Krajina (RSK) was proclaimed a U.N. protected area under the plan of special U.N. envoy for the former Yugoslavia Cyrus Vance in March 1992, after the Krajina-Croatia conflict broke out in 1991 because of Croatia's forcible secession from the former Yugoslavia.

The RSK, which comprises predominantly Serb-populated areas within the administrative borders of the former Yugoslav republic of Croatia, was proclaimed in response to Croatia's forcible secession and the attempt of its authorities to reduce the Serb people to a national minority.

Kontic said in a letter sent to U.N. Secretary-General Butrus-Ghali that U.N. resolution 871 of October 4, 1993, under which the UNPROFOR's mandate was extended until March 31, 1994, envisaged that the U.N. peace-keepers "remain in the UNPAs until a comprehensive political settlement of the Yugoslav crisis is found."

In the letter, a copy of which was sent to TANJUG on Tuesday, Kontic said that resolution 871 also envisaged that the "UNPROFOR mandate is to be renewed if such a solution is not achieved through negotiations."

"It is not necessary to make special mention of the importance of the UNPROFOR presence in the past, since it was precisely UNPROFOR that has ensured the consistent implementation of the Vance plan, enabled the maintenance of fragile peace and prevented further confrontation of the parties in conflict," Kontic said in the letter.

The Yugoslav prime minister set out that the "F.R. of Yugoslavia considers that conditions have not yet been created for terminating the UNPROFOR peace mission and that the UNPROFOR presence in the UNPAs is necessary until a political settlement is reached."

The letter said that if new U.N. troops were to be engaged or regularly replaced, it would, "for historical reasons, be inappropriate to engage troops" from neighbouring countries or former occupying forces.

The Yugoslav prime minister said that the "F.R.Y. supports the Vance plan and is interested" that it be fully

respected and implemented by all parties. Kontic said that Yugoslavia would "strive to facilitate the UNPROFOR peace mission in the former Yugoslavia and contribute, within the limits of its possibilities, to reducing the costs of the peace mission."

Serbia**Marjanovic Presents Government Program***AU1503143594 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in
Serbo-Croatian 1030 GMT 15 Mar 94*

[Speech by Mirko Marjanovic, Serbian prime minister-designate, to the Serbian Assembly in Belgrade—live]

[Text] Esteemed deputies, Mr. Milosevic, president of the Republic of Serbia, has entrusted me with the mandate to create the government of the Republic of Serbia. After holding comprehensive consultations, I am going to propose the government members to you today. At the same time, before the government is elected I want to put forward its program.

The political (?pressures) from abroad and grave economic and social problems that we have been confronted with in the country require clear answers and resolute steps from us. The basic thing is to create an economic and political atmosphere in which the creativity, hard work, and entrepreneurship of our citizens will have more free scope, despite the economic sanctions, and the significant potential of our economy can be activated. Instead of adapting passively to difficult business conditions and to survival, the government of the Republic of Serbia that this prominent house should elect today will do everything with a view to marking 1994 with permanent positive changes and above all to having the policy of peace, which we shall persistently advocate, contribute to a just solution for the Serbian people in the Srpska republic and the republic of Serbian Krajina. By defending peace, we shall also be maintaining our economic recovery in the best way. We should show determination in implementing the program for reconstruction of the monetary system and the strategy of economic recovery of the country in order, now that inflation has been checked, to be able to quickly increase production, improve the standard of living, and provide prospects for the young generation. The operation of the rule of law should be clearly felt and affirmed, and the principles of democratic rule should be affirmed.

The past year has shown more than clearly that the economy and society simply cannot function under hyperinflation. Hyperinflation has had a destructive and devastating effect on all spheres of life. It has blocked production, contributed to many an injustice in distribution, and brought the standard of living of the majority of population below the level of bare subsistence. The program for reconstruction of the monetary system and the strategy of economic recovery that we have started to implement has proved to be the only response to the great difficulties the Yugoslav economy

has been experiencing under the sanctions, the war around us, and the large number of refugees from war-affected regions.

The program is a highly professional one, and the new government unanimously accepts it as the basis of its policy, determined to consistently implement it together with the Federal Government. Not only the federal and republican governments, but also a great majority of experts and businessmen have assessed that there is no alternative to this program. In particular, it has been wholeheartedly accepted by the citizens, who justifiably feel threatened by the economic chaos. The return to a healthy dinar, a balanced budget, and financial discipline, these being essential elements of monetary reform and the most important means of curbing inflation, are only the initial, albeit inevitable, steps in the attempt to stabilize the economy and bring an increase in production, employment, and the standard of living. An examination has shown that our foreign exchange and other reserves are greater than had been assumed and in any case sufficient if the whole program is consistently implemented.

The program must be regarded not only as a package of measures to curb hyperinflation and bring a short-term improvement of the economic situation, but also as a fundamental turnabout in the way we conduct economic operations. There has long been such an intention in the projections of our economic system, but it has never been consistently applied. What was lacking was a healthy currency as the objective criterion for business or any other kind of decisionmaking in economic life. And that we now have.

The reform of the monetary system puts strong pressure on the economy in the direction of rational behavior, which is not only in one's own interest, but also in the general social interest. With increased independence, the responsibility of an enterprise for its survival and prosperity, as well as for the existence of the workers it employs increases. By doing away with primary emission, wages must be earned and in order to earn them, one must produce and in fact produce the goods the market wants.

One of the basic aims of economic policy will be to support the restructuring of big enterprises—where economically justifiable—and to stimulate the more rapid development of small and medium-sized enterprises. Of course, the state cannot take upon itself the enterprises' job of increasing production and improving efficiency. However, it can give its support to stimulating entrepreneurship and market-oriented production and will do so, proceeding from the fact that a healthy dinar is above all the main motive and at the same time an economic imperative for achieving better results.

We shall try to expand the domestic market for the reconstructed and the new production. The government shall be particularly active in encouraging the export orientation of our economy, although we are aware of all

the limits that have been imposed by the sanctions. However, export possibilities exist even now. We particularly need to prepare for the period after the sanctions are lifted. The Serbian economy has always had its place in the world, it had, and still has, something to offer to the world market. We shall also create favorable conditions for foreign capital investments. Serbia cannot achieve its economic independence within a closed economy, but only through a decisive and wise opening up toward the world based on our developmental advantages, primarily our expert and qualified people—particularly the young ones—significant industrial capacities, agriculture, natural resources, and the favorable economic position of our country. With the successful monetary reconstruction of our monetary system, we have, in this phase, stabilized the economy and helped the existentially most threatened level of society. This must now be accompanied by an increase in production and real wages, and must coincide with the initiation of new investments. Our policy is aimed at increasing the national revenue and measures to make its distribution economically stimulating and, in social terms, as fair as possible. I appeal to you to help us realize these tasks, in spite of the party differences, which we will respect.

The difficult task of rebalancing the republic's budget lies before us. The increase of any source of budget revenue causes resistance and skepticism among the public, while, on the other hand, the termination and reduction of any achieved right to budgetary funds elicits anger and protest. Because of this, we are faced with the question of how to balance the budget without again reaching for primary emission and avoiding the chaos of last year's hyperinflation. The government shall—decisively and persistently—decrease budgetary expenditure. However, we also intend to undertake the necessary reforms of the taxation system, which would have a stimulating effect on our economy and lead to larger tax revenue without increasing tax rates. We shall also strive to encompass the gray economy with the tax [word indistinct]. We shall strive to promote state bonds on the capital market as soon as possible, which would contribute to the reduction of our budget deficit without a supplemental emission of money and a new tax burden. On the other hand, the legal and other obligations that our republic services from the budget are great, particularly obligations toward the level of social and medical protection, security of our citizens and state, pensioners and the unemployed, education, science, and culture, our compatriots in the Srpska republic and the republic of Serbian Krajina, and refugees who sought refuge in our republic. The established framework for public expenditure, as set out in the program, must under no circumstances be interfered with. This means that the government must under no circumstances give in to any requests and principles for increasing the budgetary expenditure. However, the Assembly also bears its part of the responsibility for this. We should not insist on legislation that would impose new obligations on the republic, and for which funds have not been earmarked

in the budget. The same type of restriction should also apply to tax exemption. No tax relief can be approved unless its scope is established, and the lost budget revenue is made up for in other ways. There is room for decreasing public expenditure. The Constitution has transferred to the republic many of the functions that used to be in domain of municipalities or various self-management associations, alliances, organizations, institutes, and chambers. Thanks to inertia, much of this unnecessary load has been maintained until today.

Many of these unnecessary expenses stem from irrational behavior in the system of the health and education institutions, in the governmental apparatus, and elsewhere. The government is determined to remove these. Concrete programs will be introduced to rationalize and reduce all that cannot be accepted in the sphere of public expenditure with our current low national income. The same is envisaged for public enterprises. Their role is to ensure on an economically sound basis the working of the economy and the life of the citizens, and not to conceal the multitude of irrationalities and weaknesses behind their frequently monopolistic behavior.

A policy of balancing the budget must be implemented in order to increase public income. I believe that every tax measure of the government will come under a critical gaze, and the government will treat such criticism responsibly. However, the government will stand firm when it comes to everyone having to pay tax, provided of course that taxes are in line with the economic ability of the taxpayer.

On the other hand, citizens have to know where their money is going, and how even the last dinar is spent. The government will abide by the proposals and programs suggesting that tax rates should not be increased, but rather that the tax base and the number of taxpayers be extended.

In implementing the policy of balancing the budget, the government is determined to establish the strictest of budgetary disciplines, and will cooperate closely with the Federal Government and the Montenegrin Government. That is why we call on you deputies in this Assembly, and the public in general, to extend your full support to this policy.

The policy of healthy currency will represent the main impetus to all the economic activities and the realistic increase of the social product in stable conditions. Without much involvement or sponsorship by the state and its bodies, room will be made for free entrepreneurs and economic initiative. The places where realistic economic calculation is possible are places where solid production and successful trade will also be possible. In other words, the aim of the government is to create an atmosphere in which the market motivation for production will strengthen.

I beg you for your attention. You will have a chance, colleagues deputies, to participate as much as you like later on.

Instead of having illusions about production and new investment based on the currency issue, a market system will be created in which everyone will be motivated and economically forced to produce and sell as much as he can. The bitter experiences of the last few years have taught us that motivating production from the primary issue inflicts the most damage on that very production. Another chance should not be given to those who still do not believe this. Such lessons have already cost too much. For that reason all companies will have to establish themselves on the grounds of realistic economic criteria. None of them should expect any more state subsidies from the budget or the currency issue. They should themselves become an important source of budgetary income and new investment. I suggest to companies that expect this, rather than through their own production, that they will find a solution in state subsidies and [word indistinct] directly or through the trade union, that they should immediately change their managers, since the government will not accept any financing without backing or any other form of deviation from the program.

A healthy economy, even if it is temporarily poor, still has great possibilities to exploit the resources available and become rich, while an unhealthy economy that is financed without backing can never become that. That is why there is no alternative to the policy of a healthy and stable currency, and that is why the government will not give up on this policy at any cost.

The government's agricultural policy will also be in line with the spirit of the fundamental commitments in the program. This means that the agriculture and the food industry will be placed in the same conditions of production as other fields, there will be full equality of all property relations, and stimulative measures will be introduced that will motivate the merging of agricultural property and the development of farms, by giving full freedom to the development of co-operatives, by securing protection prices for the basic agricultural products, and by introducing other forms of development motivation. Here, too, there can be no return to financing without backing. Agricultural production will be supported only from realistic resources and with firm guarantees.

With the aim of stimulating production, better supply, and strengthening the position of the new dinar, the most important issue now is the increase of traffic, both by accessing reserves and by exchanging companies' foreign currency for new dinars. The government shall insist that the process of exchanging companies and banks' foreign currency is expedited without any administrative restrictions in order to make it possible for production and trade to—on the basis of their financial potential—acquire fresh funds necessary for carrying out business functions. [sentence as heard] Those companies that already have good programs should be given immediate support. They should immediately begin realizing these programs, including production for export. However, the impression is that some of the banks have still not

adapted to these conditions. The measures of the monetary policy should establish conditions for banks to respect the need for reasonable real interest rates, and as soon as possible. That is one of the key prerequisites for increasing production on market principles. The settlement of debts and the reinstatement of trust in banks and other financial institutions is to a significant degree linked to solving the problem of old foreign currency savings. Serbia will not allow a single one of its foreign currency savers to be deprived of his or her foreign currency investment or its value in dinars. Concrete solutions for this problem will be proposed in a relatively short while. The moving of social policy outside the domain of the company and, based on this, the strengthening of their competitive edge is a very important aim of the entire program. It is known that a great number of temporarily unemployed workers objectively are not participating in the production process and that this has been so for some time. They are now essentially receiving welfare from their companies. The state, and not the company, must secure welfare and security for the citizens and the unemployed. The state must primarily help the workers who have been laid off by helping them to change their professions and through alternative employment. Moreover, paying out the income of unemployed workers in the form of welfare taken from the state budget rather than the companies would represent a more rational solution, if nothing else because it would eliminate the costs that arise from keeping in business unprofitable companies and fictitious employment. However, we are not focusing on laying off the surplus of employees. We are talking about a gradual process of structural changes with a stress on an active policy of new, real rather than fictitious employment of people, along with respecting the fact that there are people among the employment who have their own capital—land or other sources of income—and who are taking up the places of those for whom their jobs are the only source of income. The government will be actively involved in the process of collective negotiating about salaries that goes on between labor unions and the chamber of commerce. However, we wish to have the smallest possible amount of administrating and regulating. [sentence as heard] Salaries within the economy as a whole should be freely formed, and it is up to the government to—in accordance with the budget restrictions—regulate salaries in businesses that do not produce anything in and public companies.

The initial phase of the program primarily focuses on the revival of the national currency. However, at the same time, it marks the beginning of a lasting revival of the economy. Once a market ambience is established—its basic outlines—the state will have its real role in regulating economic life. The state will devote itself to organizing and protecting the economic and civil organization and the basic market institutions, which—along with conducting economic policy—is its basic, but in our society neglected, role. What we have in mind here is primarily the protection of contracts and property, and

the protection of the monetary and fiscal systems, institutions of the goods, labor, and capital markets.

In connection with this, I call on the Federal Parliament to pass, as soon as possible, crucial economic and systemic laws that will put into operation the market economic conditions. [sentence as heard] These are primarily laws on companies, employment, the capital market, and the transformation of property. We shall propose a new law [words indistinct] which we believe will be democratic, publicly controlled, and socially acceptable.

The basic principles on which this law will be based are the autonomy of the companies in making decisions on the transformation of property, the realistic value of the capital, the openness of the model, and the stimulative quality and justness.

As for the regional development policy, the government—in accordance with the program—will implement it in such a way that it will primarily insist on the activation of the number of already built but unexploited capacities. At the same time the government will concentrate resources for the development of the infrastructure primarily in the underdeveloped regions in order to create favorable conditions for potential investors. In the context of such a development policy, the particular advantages will be given to Kosovo and Metohija, but we have to stress that the program does not allow exceptions so the failure to use the existing capacities cannot be replaced by constant demands for new investments.

The control functions of the state are of a particular importance for the implementation of the program. The government will prepare a special program for the organizational and the personnel strengthening of the inspections and the finance police. Control of the monetary and the criminal sphere will be conducted together with the Federal Government, which will hamper the illegal transactions and trade.

As for the judiciary, which is to provide the necessary protection for citizens-entrepreneurs and therefore the program, the changes in the Federal and Serbian legislature will provide for the radical sanctioning of economic and financial offenses.

The safety of the citizens and the security of their property will be in future, too, a priority of the government. The previous activities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in the extremely complex conditions of neighboring war, have secured a stable security situation in the republic. Further modernization and the constant adjustments of this service to the changes in the country and around is a task the government will deal with regularly.

Esteemed peoples' deputies, by devoting itself to the tasks that the executive authorities have in a legal state, the Serbian Government will make every effort—in accordance with the law and the Constitution—to carry out the responsibility it has taken on at this difficult

moment to implement the program of monetary reconstruction and the economic recovery of our country together with the Federal Government and the Montenegrin Government. The program, which has been built on the basis of a market economy, has drawn a line between the competences, treating all sectors of economy equally. The success of the reform demands from everyone to respond to the duties in their line of work. This means that the economy will have to turn to the production and to rely fully on its own initiatives and entrepreneurship. The social services will have to show a greater degree of responsibility and efficiency. The state administration will have to work more expertly and react more quickly in eliminating the obstacles in the consistent implementation of the program, and a higher degree of readiness in fighting crimes of all kinds, and in eliminating war profiteering.

The citizens are given a particularly important role. Without their full confidence, their acceptance of the program, and their understanding for the inevitable teething difficulties, without their response to their tax and other duties, the implementation of the program would undoubtedly encounter further difficulties. Because of the serious changes it brings with it, the program has—in my opinion—historical importance. It has such importance particularly as a means for the defense of the sovereignty of the country. It has taken great courage for us to commit ourselves to a convertible dinar at times of an economic blockade, and succeed in defending it.

For its part, the Serbian Government stresses its firm resoluteness in persevering in the consistent implementation of the program of monetary reform and economic recovery. The government is aware that the organization of the governmental bodies has to be improved, and they have to be made responsible for carrying out tasks. In line with that, the government will undertake a series of operational measures and will organize a system to observe the implementation of the program in order to react promptly to transgressions as they occur.

I am convinced that we are all aware of the difficulties connected with this task, and of the significance of the period before us. None of us has any illusion that differing views and attitudes can be avoided in a democratic assembly between political parties, and in accordance with that, that this program and the policy based on it will easily get the necessary support here. I have to stress, however, that economic life itself has almost imposed such a program as an alternative to the chaos of hyperinflation and complete collapse with unpredictable economic, social, and political consequences. That is why I call on all the parties and the deputies on the behalf of the government to cooperate on this program, whose main orientation must not be questioned at any time.

The serious efforts that the government has to put in in the next few months and years to achieve economic revitalization are indeed necessary in order to alleviate the effects of the sanctions. These efforts will continue to

be necessary even after the sanctions are lifted in order to avoid economic and political chaos, to protect domestic production from unprincipled rivalry from outside, and to provide all those market, production, and financial rules that are necessary for an economy to become more successful.

However, these great and imperative efforts concerning the economy that the government must undertake should also be accompanied by similarly great and imperative efforts in other spheres of social life—health, education, science, culture, and information.

The international blockade undermined not only the economic life in Serbia but the social life as well, and for this reason, related efforts are needed. The international blockade definitely brought about a stagnation in the development of science, the provincialization of culture, education that is excessively turned exclusively toward the national and the past, and subjectivity and defeatism in the dissemination of information. These are the occurrences that more or less cannot be avoided under the conditions of a major international blockade. Other countries in a similar situation would have behaved in a similar manner.

Under the current circumstances, it is not our task to contribute toward the sanctions with our own behavior and, while the sanctions last—even though justly infuriated by the world—not to turn our back to the world and remain isolated and lonely for longer than the sanctions have been imposed. In education, for example, we must make an effort at every level—from schools to universities—to link ourselves to the greatest achievements and best experiences in the developed world. The aim of this linkage would be to prepare the young generation for professional and intellectual activity and for work and life in the third millennium.

Education must rid itself as quickly and as seriously as possible of the pathetic orientation toward the national, especially toward the national past. Isolationism in education is more dangerous than economic isolationism. Its consequences are reflected in the ideas of the youngest generations and last long after the ideas and practice of isolationism have passed. Through education, the young generation must be made capable of working and living in the coming era. It must be capable of criticizing this era, but also of critically promoting it and loving it.

At this moment, science has been entirely exposed to the danger of stagnation. Despite the lack of material and financial resources and the interruption of numerous institutional and personal links abroad, and despite the confusion, disillusionment, and even opportunism that can be encountered in the humanistic sciences, the government will make every effort to secure greater material and financial resources for the development of science in faculties and institutes, to restore scientific links with Europe and the world that can be restored, despite the sanctions, especially once the sanctions are

lifted, and to encourage scientific work in the sphere of natural and social sciences with a policy of grants, the publishing of scientific publications, and the creation of an overall atmosphere that science to a great degree holds the answer on how to lead a richer and more humane life today and in the future.

Culture as a whole is also a victim of the sanctions, the war encirclement, and all the consequences brought on by the country's disintegration. The creation of artwork has been endangered, as well as their interpretation and conveyance to other people. The conditions for artistic creativity, as well making artistic and cultural heritage accessible to as many people as possible, especially young, must be radically changed in a positive sense. Just like education, the arts and sciences must turn to the present and the future, to the world, and to other cultures. They must free themselves from the domination of the past, which threatens to make the cultural life provincial and autarkic.

Radical changes must especially be implemented in the sphere of information dissemination. This is often dominated by the air of pessimism and defeatism, bourgeois, and superficial attitude toward society and its problems, especially toward solutions for these problems. The dissemination of information is partially responsible for the impression that everyone in the world is against the Serbs and that for these and other reasons we do not need anyone. This impression is naturally unfounded. It is not true that everyone is against the Serbs, as it equally not true that the Serbs can exist by themselves as an economical, political, and cultural Robinson Crusoe, at least not if they want to be successful and happy.

Information dissemination must be made more objective, versatile, and cultured regarding our country and foreign countries. It must bring back optimism to the public, at least to an extent to which it has lessened it. Despite all our problems, there is no reason why this optimism could not be realistic. This country and these people have preserved energy, dignity, and hope under the conditions of sanctions, while this government, knowing and respecting this energy, dignity, and hope, will do everything to free us from the sanctions, and [word indistinct] to live humanely as much as we can under the sanctions. The government has a duty to do this because of the Serbian citizens and especially because of the young generation, which wants to live in peace, freedom, and prosperity and which is willing to make its contribution toward this peace, freedom, and prosperity. However, it must make its contribution through education, work, and creativeness.

Such a determination of the young generation is our biggest asset. I end my expose in a desire to preserve this wealth and increase it further. [applause]

Opposition Responds

AU1603115894 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 16 Mar 94

[Report by Zoran Vaskovic from the Serbian Assembly]

[Text] The Serbian Assembly has continued the discussion on the government's program and composition as proposed by Prime Minister-designate Mirko Marjanovic yesterday. Zoran Vaskovic reports from the Assembly:

[Vaskovic] Eleven deputies took part in the discussion this morning. Their speeches, and the speeches by another 50 deputies still to speak, indicate that the debate will be long and polemic. With one exception, all the speakers were deputies from the opposition parties. They expressed the objection that the proposed program is too general and that it does not stand a chance of being implemented. They also demanded further cuts in the budget. The deputies from the opposition parties stressed that the cabinet of Mirko Marjanovic is not a government of national unity, as he had tried to achieve.

The only member of the ruling party who spoke today was Zoran Andjelkovic. The essence of his speech was that the opposition has not achieved any results in the communes where they won.

Let us repeat: We are facing a long debate, after which the deputies will vote on the new government. In order to be elected, the government needs at least 126 votes. Aleksandra Jankovic is currently addressing the Assembly and some 50 more deputies are still to speak. That is all from the Serbian Assembly.

Churkin Visits Belgrade, Meets With Karadzic

AU1603114294 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 16 Mar 94

[Text] Vitaliy Churkin, special envoy of the Russian president, has suddenly arrived in Belgrade as part of the latest peace initiative of the United States and Russia to find a solution to the Bosnian conflict. Immediately on arrival, Churkin met Radovan Karadzic, president of the Srpska republic. It has been unofficially learned that Churkin will also be received by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic.

According to the latest statements by Churkin, the three warring factions in Bosnia could meet at a negotiating table as early as next week. This round of negotiations would be held outside the framework of the Geneva Conference and would be mediated by the United States and Russia.